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ABSTRACT
A balance-of-power argument that completely discounts the role played by the
United States has been employed in a recent attempt to explain both the origins of
European integration and the Continent’s recent difficulties. This thesis sets out to rebut
these notions through an examination of the historical record. Such an examination
makes it clear that France and West Germany’s reasons for pursuing the integration of
Western Europe were grounded in these states’ relationships with one another within the
postwar context, not in their fear of Soviet aggression. France, after all, was seeking to
rebuild itself and hold down the Germans after the war, while West Germany was
seeking to regain its sovereignty. Further, it is clear from the historical record that the
role played by the United States in the earliest iterations of postwar European integration
was critical and should not be discounted.
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One
Introduction
While regional integration has become a very important part of the modern world
since the end of World War II, recent financial difficulties in Europe have called the
persistence of regional integration into question. Indeed, the European debt crisis has
caused such uncertainty within the eurozone that some observers question whether the
European Union will continue to enjoy the support of the states that created it. Gaining a
proper understanding of the conditions that made early European integrative efforts
successful is therefore important, as it is this understanding which will make a more
accurate prediction regarding the future of regional integration on the Continent possible.
Such an understanding may also assist in the creation of a general theory of regional
integration, as European integration is often considered to be the most advanced and,
therefore, perhaps the most instructive example of this phenomenon.
In order to effectively pursue such an understanding, one must go all the way
back to the critical early years of European integration and examine the reasons why the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) – the institution which would prove to be
the earliest forerunner of the modern-day European Union – was created. The historical
record indicates that this is a complicated story. The reasons behind the pursuit of
integration in the years following World War II reflect the varying interests of the states
involved, making it clear that there was not one simple, overarching rationale that made
1

integration in Europe appealing to all. Additionally, the historical record demonstrates
that the efforts of the United States were critical to the formation of the ECSC, and that
without its assistance to the Continent and encouragement of the ECSC concept, regional
integration likely would not have enjoyed the success that it did. The role played by the
U.S. was so crucial, in fact, that European integration may never have occurred at all
apart from American efforts.
This complex, multi-causal explanation of European integration in the postwar era
flies in the face of recent scholarship. Sebastian Rosato, in “Europe’s Troubles: Power
Politics and the State of the European Project,”1 presents an altogether different narrative
regarding the formation of the earliest iteration of the modern-day European Union.
Rosato asserts that the Europeans’ desire to seek regional integration was the result of a
simple balance-of-power calculation based on their fear of the Soviet Union.2 Indeed, he
argues that the decisions made by France and West Germany to pursue economic
integration via the ECSC were driven by “balance of power thinking,”3 and that the
overwhelming comparative strength of the Soviet Union in the early years of the Cold
War was the sole reason why these and four other states decided to pursue the unification
of Western Europe.4 He posits further that, based on this understanding of the origins of
European integration, it makes sense that the states of Europe currently “have no
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compelling reason to preserve their economic community.”5 The need to balance the
powerful Soviet Union disappeared with that state’s demise in 1991, so the impetus to
pursue and sustain integrative efforts in Europe has also disappeared. In Rosato’s view,
then, it should come as no surprise that the economic downturn of recent years has put
stress on the institutions of Europe and caused some states to pursue self-serving policies
that may not be beneficial for Europe as a whole.6 Europe, according to Rosato, is
“fraying.”7
The historical record, however, tells a different story. In order to truly grasp the
genesis of European integration, one must begin with World War II. The wholesale
destruction of Western Europe that resulted from this terrible war ultimately provided
much of the impetus for the pursuit of regional integration in Europe, with a number of
goals held by European policy elites stemming directly from this conflict. The French, for
their part, placed a great deal of emphasis on rebuilding their country in the immediate
postwar period, an effort that required access to a very large amount of natural resources.
The Ruhr – a region which, as defined by the French in October 1945, included the
entirety of the coalfield east of the Rhine – was seen as an important supplier of these
resources. As a result, French policy elites sought to internationalize this portion of
Germany, an action which would allow them unfettered access to the enormously
valuable coke and coal that were mined there.8 This desire to pursue internationalization
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eventually led to a French realization of the necessity and desirability of placing all of the
coal and steel resources of Western Europe under supranational control,9 thereby laying
the foundation for the creation of the ECSC. The fear of a resurgent Germany, however,
also entered very prominently into the calculations of French policy elites as they
considered the creation of an integrated Western Europe. By folding the tremendous coal
and steel resources of West Germany into a larger European supranational framework,
the French believed that they might be able to prevent a reindustrialized Germany from
initiating yet another destructive war.10 The French also believed that tying West
Germany into Western supranational institutions would prevent the Germans from
turning their backs on the West and allying themselves with the Soviet Union.11 In sum,
the French were attempting to gain some degree of control over the Germans through the
creation of the ECSC. While there is a place for the USSR in this narrative, it is, in fact,
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after the French had already decided upon and proposed the Schuman Plan, as it was after
the Communist incursion into South Korea that the potential threat posed by the USSR
became solidified in the minds of the French. This means, of course, that a fear of the
Soviet Union had much more to do with the ECSC’s eventual success than its initiation.
West German policy elites, on the other hand, sought above all else to end the
occupation of their defeated country by the victorious Allies and return to some level of
normalcy. Their ultimate goal, of course, was for West Germany to be seen as and treated
like an equal in the international community, something that was impossible as long as
the country was being run by foreign powers. The first step toward the realization of this
goal was the accession of West Germany to the Council of Europe. This would only be
possible, however, if a favorable outcome could be had vis-à-vis the Saar, which had
essentially been handed over to France by the Allies in the wake of World War II.12 West
Germany was still concerned about its own economic recovery after the war, after all,
meaning it desired to maintain access to Western Europe’s critical natural resources. The
supranational ECSC provided a solution to this problem. The ECSC also became the
method by which the Ruhr question would be answered in a manner that satisfied the
Germans,13 as it provided a means for them to gain something from the
internationalization of the Ruhr14 while simultaneously assuaging the fears of their
neighbors. The ECSC also provided a way for the German government to eradicate the
excessive nationalism that was reestablishing itself in West Germany in the late 1940s as
12
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a result of the Saar and Ruhr conflicts. The French and the Germans, then, had what seem
to be very different motivations for pursuing the integration of their continent, meaning
the reasons why the Europeans decided to pursue integration after World War II are
clearly much more complicated than Rosato indicates.
Rosato also presents an alternative account with regard to the role played by the
United States during the early years of European integration. In it, he completely
discounts the part played by the Western superpower, claiming that “U.S. encouragement
was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for [European] integration.”15 Again,
the historical record paints a different picture. The critical importance of the American
contribution to the success of early European integrative efforts also began with World
War II. After playing a vital part in the Allied victory over the Axis powers, the United
States was undeniably the most powerful Western country in the world. As a result, it
was able to exert a great deal of influence over the affairs of Western Europe. This
influence largely stemmed from three sources: the United States’ control over occupied
Germany, the United States’ ability to contribute financially to the reconstruction of the
countries devastated by World War II, and the United States’ ability to provide security
for the Continent. American policy elites believed that the revitalization of Germany was
indeed necessary,16 and that it had to occur within a European framework.17 When
combined with a fear of Soviet encroachment upon Western Europe, these beliefs led to
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the creation of the Marshall Plan.18 Through this plan, the Americans hoped in some way
to convince the French, whose acceptance of the Marshall Plan was seen as critical to the
plan’s success,19 to accept the reconstruction of Germany,20 a vital precondition for the
creation of a unified Western Europe. The United States also hoped that the Marshall
Plan would, through the creation of the Organization for European Economic
Cooperation, lay a practical foundation for the integration of Western Europe,21
something which had, again, come to be seen as necessary for a continent that had
completely torn itself apart over the course of the previous half century.
French uneasiness about a reindustrialized Germany presented itself as an
obstacle to the Americans’ chosen policy of European integration, however.22 The
horrors of World War II were still vivid in French minds, meaning that fear of Germany
was still a common sentiment in France.23 As a result, a security guarantee from the
United States against future German aggression became necessary for the French to
embrace the total reindustrialization of Germany, and this was achieved through the
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creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.24 The French simply did not want to
be left alone on the Continent with Germany, and NATO saw to it that they would not be,
even once the Americans decided to stop occupying the defeated German state. With
France on board with German reindustrialization and inclusion in a Western European
framework, the integration of the Continent became possible, meaning American
involvement as Europe’s peacekeeper was critical.25
Additionally, while there were musings about the concept of European integration
during the interwar period,26 it was the Truman administration that actually put forward
the concrete idea for the integration of Western Europe’s coal and steel industries.27 The
American acceptance of the potential benefits that came along with the aforementioned
French preoccupation with the internationalization of the Ruhr28 led the Truman
administration to suggest that the creation of a supranational coal and steel community
might be a good way to maintain wider European access to the resources of the Ruhr
without alienating West Germany and forcing it into the open arms of the Soviet Union.
This basic idea was presented two years later as the Schuman Plan,29 the proposal to
integrate the coal and steel industries of France and West Germany that ultimately led to
the creation of the ECSC.
24
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Finally, the Eisenhower administration, picking up the mantle of support for
European integration from its predecessor, provided critical assistance to the ECSC that
allowed it to achieve success in the early days of its operation. One of the most important
manifestations of this assistance came in the form of a large loan from the United States
government to the embryonic ECSC. This loan was seen as critical by Jean Monnet, as it
helped the ECSC fund its modernization efforts30 while conspicuously reaffirming
American support for the process of European integration.31 Additionally, Monnet
suggested, and Adenauer supported, the appointment of an official American ambassador
to the new ECSC. They believed that such a move by the Eisenhower administration
would further underscore the importance that the United States placed on furthering the
process of integration in Europe, an important consideration in light of the fact that these
key European elites saw American support for their integrative efforts as critical to their
success.32 Not only was American support for the unification of Europe an indispensible
part of getting this process off the ground, but it was also a crucial part of seeing to it that
it ultimately succeeded.
Rosato’s narrative in “Europe’s Troubles: Power Politics and the State of the
European Project” is simply not supported by the historical record. This calls into
question the entire balance of power-based theory of institutions that he presents, making
his predictions regarding the future of integration in Europe suspect as a result. Since a
proper understanding of the history of Europe is an integral part of the creation of any
30
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31
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32
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prediction regarding the future of Europe, this paper, using the current literature on the
topic of European integration as well as the historical record, will explain the real reasons
why “the Six” – France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg – signed the 1951 Treaty of Paris and thereby took the first step toward the
creation of the modern-day EU. France and West Germany will be the focal points of this
study, as it was these two states that initiated the process of European integration in the
first place. This paper will also shed light on precisely how important American
encouragement of and involvement in early European integrationist efforts actually were.
The aforementioned Truman and Eisenhower administrations, which were critical to both
the creation and the subsequent success of the fragile early iterations of European
integration, will be examined as this paper seeks to understand the role played by the
Americans in early Continental integrationist efforts.
What will become clear throughout is that the motivations held by the Europeans
went far beyond a simple wish to balance the Soviet Union, reflecting instead each
individual state’s respective desires. These desires reflected their relationships with each
other within the postwar context far more than they reflected their relationships with the
USSR, and that is perhaps the key to gaining an accurate understanding of the reasons
why the Europeans decided to seek integration. Additionally, the crucial role played by
the United States will be made plain. Put simply, the United States’ financial and military
might put it in the position to encourage the Europeans to pursue integration by putting
pressure on them to do so while providing the environment within which integration
became possible. This encouragement was essential, and European integration simply

10

would not have happened the way it did without it. The Truman administration did, after
all, also provide the Europeans with a concrete way to begin the process of integration,
something which had been lacking when Europeans had pondered integration before.
Without World War II, then, it seems that European integration may never have
happened, as it very clearly set the stage for the United States to facilitate an experiment
in Continental supranationality.

11

Two
European Motivations
When one seeks to understand and explain the earliest years of Continental
integration, one must look first and foremost to World War II. In the wake of the
horrifying destruction that occurred in Western Europe during that war, the statesmen of
both France and, after its creation, West Germany had many national goals that they
wished to accomplish. For the French, the reconstruction of their country was paramount,
while the West Germans sought above all else to regain the sovereignty that they had lost
as a result of the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany and the occupation of their
state. While these aims clearly grew out of the situations that these states found
themselves in as a result of the war, other critical goals stemmed from these states’
relationships with one another, as the French still greatly feared the possibility of future
German aggression and wanted to see Germany held down as a result. France and
Germany’s respective decisions to embrace integration can be directly explained by these
and other national aims. They cannot, however, be satisfactorily explained purely by a
desire to balance the power of the Soviet Union, as Rosato claims.33 As will become clear
in the coming pages, to attempt to make the case that the Europeans’ efforts reflected a

33
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one-dimensional desire such as this simply does not to do justice to the historical record,
which plainly lays out a multi-causal, state-centric narrative for the genesis of European
integration.
At the end of World War II, the first thing that needed to be taken care of was the
rebuilding of a ravaged Western Europe. In France, this effort to achieve reconstruction
took the form of Jean Monnet’s Plan de Modernisation et Ré-équipment (also known as
the Monnet Plan), which was adopted in March 1946. This plan sought to not only
achieve prewar levels of industrial output but also, and perhaps just as importantly,
modernize certain key industries and, by extension, the country as a whole. The six
critical sectors that needed attention according to the Monnet Plan were coal mining,
electricity, steel, cement, agricultural machinery, and transport. The target for these
sectors was to match France’s peak interwar output – which was achieved in 1929 – by
1948 and to exceed it by 25% by 1950.34
For Monnet, the pursuit of such an ambitious plan was important largely because
France had fallen behind the other great European powers during the interwar period.
There had been, in his eyes, a “technological revolution” that France had missed out on,
and he desired to see his nation catch up. As he put it, “Modernization and reconstruction
must go hand in hand.”35 The simultaneous pursuit of these two goals, to Monnet,
required the creation of a central plan that would guide the entire nation in its efforts.
Such a plan was necessary because “a peacetime economy would no longer tolerate the
wide safety margins which had been accepted for war production.” With the
34
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implementation of the Monnet Plan, improvements in critical areas such as productivity,
economic growth, and the living standards of the French people became permanent
national priorities. Complicated economic theories were eschewed for practical advances
in production: bigger and better factories were the goal, and the rest was left to take care
of itself.36 The rebuilding of war-torn France was essentially left completely in the hands
of Jean Monnet and his disciples at the Commissariat Général du Plan, meaning the
success of the plan became paramount for France’s future. In order for the Monnet Plan
to be successful, however, France needed to have consistent access to the necessary
natural resources. To be more specific, since the plan sought to make France more
internationally competitive – particularly with respect to and at the expense of Germany –
it was clear that its success was dependent upon an increase in the levels of German coal
and coke being put into the French economy, as this was the only way the Monnet Plan’s
lofty targets could possibly be reached.37 Only with massive imports from Germany
could France become the new center of the European steel industry.38
France had, after all, been dependent upon German coal and coke imports for
decades. This dependence began in 1890 with the creation of a large basic steel industry
in Lorraine that was based on the locally-available minette ores. After World War I,
France’s dependence on German resources increased as the French steel industry grew.
Smelting in particular created a heavy French need for German resources, as the French
minette ores being used required a very large amount of metallurgical coke for their
36
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smelting process. This came in the form of either German coke made from Ruhr coal or
French coke that was created with Ruhr coking coals, meaning the French were
dependent upon Ruhr resources either way. The amount of coking coal that was
domestically available in France was simply too small to provide for the level of industry
that France sought during the interwar period.39 Additionally, the inferior quality of
French coking coal, when compared to that which was available in the Ruhr, forced
France to look to German resources in order to create and maintain a robust domestic
steel industry.40 When World War II finally ended and the French government turned to
the Monnet Plan for its reconstruction and modernization blueprint, Ruhr resources
became necessary again. The Lorraine blast furnaces were, after all, still geared towards
the use of German coke, and France’s theoretical alternative supplier, the United
Kingdom, was experiencing a decline in coal output in the immediate aftermath of the
war. Britain, therefore, lacked an exportable surplus of the resources needed by France,
meaning that French dependence on German coke and coal was just as acute as it had
ever been.41
The Ruhr – or more accurately the maintenance of French access to Ruhr
resources – therefore became a focal point of French postwar policy. This became
obvious at the seminal London Conference on Germany, which started on February 26,
1948. The day after the conference began, the French presented their proposal to create
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an international authority for the Ruhr.42 The Ruhr had fallen within the zone of occupied
Germany that was under the control of the British Military Government, meaning the
formerly privately-held mines and steel mills that existed within the Ruhr had passed to
British government control after the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany. Seeing
this, France desired – and believed it possible – to not only internationalize the resources
of the Ruhr, but the management of the firms that existed within the Ruhr as well. This
would give them the ability to influence how Ruhr coal and coke were allocated both in
Germany and beyond its borders. Crucially, that would include exports to France,
meaning that, with the creation of a fully internationalized Ruhr, France would be able to
control at least to some degree how much German coal and coke were being sent to aid
their reconstruction and modernization efforts.43
By 1947, the United States was prepared to accept this French desire to
internationalize the Ruhr and its resources. During that year, Secretary of State George
Marshall assured the French Ambassador to the United States, Henri Bonnet, that the
U.S. was in favor of the idea that the resources of the Ruhr should be made available for
the recovery of the entirety of Europe rather than only that of Germany. While the
method by which this was to be accomplished was unclear at the time,44 these assurances
foreshadowed the agreement regarding the Ruhr that would be made at the London
Conference. On May 27, 1948, the U.S., France, and Britain agreed to the French
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proposal of February, albeit with some significant modifications.45 This agreement set up
the new International Authority for the Ruhr, a body which was created with the intention
of ensuring “that the resources of the Ruhr shall not in the future be used for the purpose
of aggression but shall be used in the interests of peace” and
that access to the coal, coke and steel of the Ruhr, which was previously subject
to the exclusive control of Germany, be in the future guaranteed without
discrimination to the countries of Europe cooperating in the common economic
good.46
In the interest of accomplishing these goals, the three powers gave the International
Authority the power to, among other things,
make the division of coal, coke and steel from the Ruhr as between German
consumption and export, in order to ensure adequate access to supplies of these
products, taking into account the essential needs of Germany.47
The powers of the International Authority were to be exercised jointly, with the United
States, Britain, France, and Germany all having three votes in the International
Authority’s representative body, while the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg were
each given one vote.48 While this agreement committed Ruhr resources to wider
European recovery and gave France the opportunity to exercise a certain amount of
control over the amount of Ruhr coal and coke that was earmarked for export, the
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agreement did not provide for international control at the firm level,49 something which
France had desperately desired in the hope that such a provision would have worked to
prevent German evasion of the decisions handed down by the International Authority.50
The International Authority for the Ruhr was not to last long, however. In
addition to the internationalization of the Ruhr, the London Conference produced a
recommendation to look into the internationalization of the wider European coal and steel
industries. This recommendation, which came directly from Marshall and reflected the
official policy of President Harry Truman, seems to have had a significant impact on Jean
Monnet,51 who, on May 4, 1950, sent a memorandum to French Foreign Minister Robert
Schuman and French Prime Minister Georges Bidault to suggest the creation of a
supranational institution that would later be realized in the form of the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC). This notion would be presented to France and the world by
Schuman on May 9, 1950, causing the plan to place the coal and steel resources of
Europe under supranational control to forever bear his name. Monnet’s memorandum
stated that a primary reason behind his suggestion to create what would later be called the
ECSC was related to France’s continued recovery. According to Monnet, France was in
danger in 1950 of failing to achieve its goal of becoming the new industrial heart of
Europe:
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The continuation of France’s recovery will be halted if the question of German
industrial production and its competitive capacity is not rapidly solved. The basis
of the superiority which French industrialists traditionally recognize in Germany
is her ability to produce steel at a price that France cannot match. From this they
conclude that the whole of French production is thereby handicapped. Already
Germany is asking to increase her production from 11 to 14 million tons. We shall
refuse, but the Americans will insist. Finally, we shall state our reservations but
we shall give in. At the same time, French production is leveling off or even
falling….With the solution proposed there is no more question of domination by
German industry….This solution, on the contrary, creates for industry – German,
French, and European – the conditions for joint expansion, in competition but
without domination. From the French point of view, such a solution gives French
industry the same start as German industry; it eliminates the dumping on export
markets which would otherwise be practised by the German steel industry; and it
enables the French steel industry to participate in European expansion, without
fear of dumping and without the temptation to form a cartel….The biggest
obstacle to the continuation of French industrial progress will have been
removed.52
Monnet sensed that the ability of the International Authority for the Ruhr to
protect French resource needs was in danger of faltering, largely due to an American
desire to see increased industrial production in Germany as well as the German wish to
be viewed as equal in the international community. Indeed, Germany resisted the
arrangements that had been agreed upon at the London Conference, refusing to be
represented within the International Authority until December 1949, the month after the
Petersberg Agreement had begun giving West Germany some level of international
recognition. Seeing that the French need for German coal and coke was not enough to
eternally justify the subservient position that Germany had been placed in after the war,
Monnet desired to carve out another method for securing these resources. He knew that
“the removal of controls over the German economy would have meant renewed
uncertainty about our vital supplies of coal, and especially of coke, and would thereby
52
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have made our steel industry very much weaker than its powerful German rival.” If
Germany wanted to increase its industrial production and begin using more and more of
the Ruhr resources that France needed and sought to control, the International Authority
for the Ruhr had to be replaced by a larger Western European coal and steel pool that
would allow France to continue having unfettered access to Ruhr resources. The success
of the Plan de Modernisation et Ré-équipment depended upon it.53
The French, therefore, decided to propose the integration of Western Europe’s
coal and steel industries partially because such a development would allow France to
continue rebuilding and modernizing itself in the wake of World War II. Because of the
way that the French steel industry had evolved in the years since its establishment in the
nineteenth century, reliable and consistent access to Ruhr coke and coal was an integral
part of the successful implementation of the Monnet Plan, meaning France needed to take
action in the immediate postwar period to secure reliable French access to these German
resources. When it appeared that France’s initial effort – the creation of the International
Authority for the Ruhr – may begin faltering in this regard, the supranational control over
Western Europe’s coal and steel industry that was embodied in the Schuman Plan was
seen by Monnet as a viable alternative. The French therefore viewed the integration of
Western Europe as tremendously desirable because it meant that their recovery could
continue and France could become a modern industrial power. The destruction of the
Continent – and particularly France – that occurred during World War II, then, led
directly to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community.
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The French attempt to gain and maintain some degree of control over German
natural resources was not solely borne out of a desire to keep their nation’s reconstruction
and modernization efforts going, however. German war-making potential entered into
France’s calculations as well. After experiencing the dreadfulness of war with Germany
three times since 1870, the French desired an arrangement that would prevent any further
outbreaks of conflict between the two historic rivals. The two World Wars in particular
had simply been too destructive and too horrific to allow for a third. This postwar fear of
a resurgent and hostile Germany54 was very clearly displayed in the 1947 Treaty of
Dunkirk that France concluded with the United Kingdom, as this treaty had as its explicit
purpose the goal of “ensuring that Germany shall not again become a menace to the
peace.”55 France obviously still deeply feared German aggression. As a result, the French
wanted to see German reindustrialization handicapped in the first few years after the war
in order to ensure their security against the Germans.56 As Bidault put it, “A lot of
Frenchmen…had the vague feeling that France would not be safe if…Germany became a
powerful industrial nation once again.”57 French efforts to prevent Germany from
realizing its full industrial potential included the virtual annexation of the coal-rich Saar
by France, the internationalization of the Ruhr, and the seizure of German factories as
54
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reparations. A French desire to see Germany permanently occupied by the Allies was
included in French plans as well.58 After the United States convinced France that such a
policy was neither desirable nor possible but that, instead, there were other means of
preventing future military aggression from a reindustrialized Germany,59 the French
turned their focus primarily to the internationalization of the Ruhr as the means by which
they might be able to bolster their own national security.60 Indeed, French – as well as
wider European – security concerns appear in the very agreement to create the
International Authority for the Ruhr.61
When the agreed-upon International Authority for the Ruhr was in danger of
failing to provide France with the materials it needed to continue reconstruction and
modernization, Monnet believed that a wider supranational pooling of the coal and steel
industries of Western Europe could take its place and keep the Monnet Plan going.
Furthermore, such a pool would have the additional benefit of ensuring that France
continued to experience the security against German attack that it desired. France, after
all, was loathe to allow Germany to be free from any sort of control over its coal and steel
industries,62 meaning the French believed that an alternative to the International
Authority had to be agreed upon before it had a chance to fail because of increased
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German steel production.63 French security goals were reflected in the May 9, 1950,
announcement that Schuman made to introduce what would become known as the
Schuman Plan. In this announcement – known as the Schuman Declaration despite the
fact that it had been written by Monnet and two of his disciples – he stated that a peaceful
Europe would have to be based upon “the elimination of the age-old opposition of France
and Germany,” and that “any action taken must in the first place concern these two
countries.” Further, he proposed
that Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a
common High Authority, within the framework of an organization open to the
participation of the other countries of Europe. The pooling of coal and steel
production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations
for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe, and will
change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the
manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant
victims. The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any
war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but
materially impossible.64
The French had very good reason to believe that the pooling of French and
German coal and steel resources would help provide security for their nation. These
resources, which had been made tremendously valuable with the arrival of the Industrial
Revolution, were spread over a triangular area that lay primarily in Germany but was
nevertheless intersected by the two countries’ national boundaries. According to Monnet,
Neither country…felt secure unless it commanded all the resources – i.e., all the
area….Coal and steel were at once the key to economic power and the raw
materials for forging weapons of war. This double role gave them immense
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symbolic significance….To pool them across frontiers would reduce their malign
prestige and turn them instead into a guarantee of peace.65
While their status as the most important resources for the waging of war was perhaps
waning with the dawn of the nuclear era, coal and steel nevertheless remained the most
critical pieces to any nation’s military buildup in 1950. They had played a decisive role in
World War I and particularly World War II, meaning control over them had been viewed
with envy by both France and Germany for generations.
By pooling the coal and steel resources of the two nations under the authority of
the European Coal and Steel Community, the French sought to make it impossible for
Germany to rearm and initiate another destructive war between them.66 If the coal and
steel resources that would be necessary for such an effort were controlled by a
supranational authority, after all, it would reduce the propensity of either nation to use
force to control the aforementioned triangular area of critical industrial resources. Just as
importantly, though, it would also make it possible for France to monitor what the
Germans were doing, immediately detect an attempt to rearm, and prevent them from
taking aggressive action against France.67 The French were not afraid to make this
important motivation behind the Schuman Declaration known to the Germans, as
Schuman himself told West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer on the day of the
Schuman Declaration that since “rearmament always showed first in an increased
production of coal, iron, and steel,” the ECSC would allow both France and Germany to
65
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“detect the first signs of rearmament, and would have an extraordinarily calming effect in
France.”68 Monnet hinted at such ideas in the Schuman Declaration itself. For him, the
purpose of the ECSC was to a large degree the protection of peace on the Continent, and,
as a result, the essence of what France was trying to accomplish with the creation of the
ECSC could be summed up in one sentence that appeared, underlined, in the copy of the
Schuman Declaration that Monnet gave to Schuman:
By the pooling of basic production and the establishment of a new High Authority
whose decisions will be binding on France, Germany, and the countries that join
them, this proposal will lay the first concrete foundations of the European
Federation which is indispensable to the maintenance of peace.
According to Monnet, “the last word was the most important: peace.”69
The latent military power of West Germany therefore also played a large role in
convincing Monnet, Schuman, and other French politicians that the integration of
Western Europe would be a beneficial undertaking. They, along with many others on the
Continent, had suffered a great deal during the first half of the twentieth century as a
result of German aggression, meaning that a certain level of fear pervaded their thinking.
Understanding that the German coal and steel industries would be the most critical
elements of any German effort to rearm, the French believed that the best way to prevent
such an occurrence was to simply place these industries under a supranational authority
such as the European Coal and Steel Community. In so doing, they believed that it would
be possible for German activities with respect to these crucial industries to be closely
monitored, meaning any German attempts to rearm would be detected during their initial
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stages and stopped. France’s past experiences with Germany, then, were clearly an
integral part of that nation’s desire to pursue the integration of Western Europe in the
postwar period. To put it simply, the French still feared the Germans in 1950, and the
integration embodied in the ECSC was one way in which they could make substantial
progress toward assuaging that fear.
The Soviet Union was also on French minds as they sought to create a Western
European coal and steel pool. Specifically, the French wanted to ensure that Germany
was tied irrevocably to the West. France recognized that a total European postwar
recovery depended upon the inclusion of West German resources, and that, if they and
the rest of the Allies continued to treat Germany as a second-class nation, it might be
tempted to turn toward the Soviet Union for support.70 The answer, therefore, was to treat
West Germany as more of an equal, but even this was not guaranteed to prevent growing
nationalism in Germany from manifesting itself as a desire to seek reunification and turn
towards the East. This reality led to American statements of caution with regard to
French demands for the internationalization of the Ruhr in 194871 and ultimately seems to
have led the French to pursue supranational control over the wider West European coal
and steel industry. If West Germany could be tied economically to France and other
Western European countries and its coal and steel resources placed under supranational
control, after all, it would have a much more difficult time turning its back on Western
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Europe and making its precious resources available to the Soviets instead of to the French
and other Western Europeans. In the words of Monnet in September 1950,
[I]f the Germans get what the Schuman Plan offers them [i.e., reindustrialization,
greater equality, and, eventually perhaps even rearmament], but without the Plan
itself, we shall run the risk of their turning their backs on us.72
To him, Germany simply had to be secured within the framework provided by the ECSC.
The Soviet threat to Western Europe also played a role in the early success of the
European Coal and Steel Community, but, contrary to Rosato’s arguments, only after it
had already been proposed by the French and the drive toward an integrated Europe had
begun. According to former Belgian Prime Minister Paul-Henri Spaak,
[A] number of Western statesmen have been dubbed either ‘fathers of European
unity’ or ‘fathers of the Atlantic Alliance’. Not one of them deserves this title: it
belongs to [Soviet Premier Josef] Stalin. Without Stalin and his aggressive
policies, without the threat with which he confronted the free world…the
movement for European unity, embracing Germany as an integral part, would
never have had the astonishing success which it has enjoyed.73
The Communist menace to Western Europe, which had been a concern to the West since
the end of World War II, seems to have been solidified in the minds of the French after
the advent of the Korean War. Monnet recognized that the climate of fear that the June
1950 invasion of South Korea by North Korean troops instilled throughout the Continent
assisted in the creation of a unified Europe.74 This climate of fear seems to have been
warranted, at least to a certain degree, as it was correctly assumed at the time that Stalin
had personally approved the North Korean invasion beforehand. Such an assumption
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naturally caused Western officials to begin comparing the divided Korea to the divided
Germany, both of which had one side allied with the Communist world and one side
allied with the Western world. If Stalin was willing to sanction a Communist invasion in
Korea, it seemed logical that he might also be willing to sanction a Communist invasion
in Germany.75 Certainly Adenauer saw his newly-formed Federal Republic of Germany
as being under threat, stating that he was “firmly convinced that Stalin was planning the
same procedure for Western Germany as had been used in Korea.”76 These assessments
proved to be logical, as the East Germans were indeed building up their forces and
actively training for a future conflict with West Germany.77 The security of the Western
world was widely perceived to be under threat, and the integration and strengthening of
the Western European war-making industries – particularly, of course, its coal and steel
industries – seemed to be a logical response to the Western Europeans.78
Western fears about Soviet aggression also seem to have nearly had the opposite
effect on Western European integration, however. The North Korean invasion occurred
the month after the Schuman Declaration and only a few days after the beginning of the
Schuman Plan conference that was convened to work out the details of the new
community amongst the states that desired to join it. Upon hearing of the conflict,
Monnet immediately recognized the potential disaster that it might inflict upon the stillembryonic plan for the creation of a coal and steel pool in Western Europe. He believed
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that the United States would not allow the Communists to get away with what they had
done, and that the Americans would seek to prepare for further Communist action in
central Europe.79 This was an accurate perception, as the fear of Soviet aggression against
West Germany caused American officials to pursue the rearmament of West Germany,
albeit with great trepidation.80 Secretary of State Dean Acheson had said only the
previous month that the U.S. “should not contemplate building up German military
forces,”81 after all. The French were shocked by this American about-face. Schuman had
said the previous year that “Germany is unarmed and will remain unarmed,” and Monnet
believed that “the mere mention of a German army was enough to horrify Europeans.”82
No one in France wanted to see anyone return “to the former aggressor the weapons he
had seemed glad to lay down.”83
The U.S. nevertheless wanted to push ahead with rearming Germany, as Germany
would inevitably be the scene of the battle in the event of Soviet aggression and it only
made sense to American officials that the Germans should contribute to their own
defense.84 Despite the French government’s official line that “there can be no question of
rearming Germany at all,”85 Acheson told Schuman at the 1950 Foreign Ministers
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meeting in New York that the U.S. would only send military reinforcements to Western
Europe if the Europeans themselves created a multinational army made up of sixty
divisions – “ten of which might be German.” Acheson wanted these European forces to
be assigned to the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization and put under the command of
an American general, “probably [Dwight] Eisenhower.” To Schuman, this demand was
unacceptable, but it nevertheless forced France’s hand. Monnet believed that there were
three options at the time for his country: to do nothing, to treat Germany on a national
basis and thereby unravel the budding drive towards European integration that was
occurring on the Continent, or to create a sort of broader Schuman Plan that would allow
the necessary actions to be taken within a European framework.86 The French chose the
third option, and the European Defense Community (EDC) proposal was the result.87
The EDC was, however, an idea that came before its intended time. The French
government had hoped that the proposal and successful implementation of the European
Coal and Steel Community would “accustom people to the idea of a European
Community before the delicate question of joint defence had to be broached.”88 Schuman,
Monnet, and others realized that the creation of a joint military structure for Western
Europe – and particularly one which might include German units – would be a difficult
sell. Military officers disliked the proposal because they disagreed that the political
advantages of integrating their units outweighed the organizational nightmares that came
with it, and almost none could appreciate the economic benefits that would have come
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along with common budgeting, centralized procurement of equipment, and the
standardized manufacture of armaments.89 Many civilians disliked the EDC plan as well,
particularly in France, where fear of German rearmament was widespread and palpable.
Indeed, the greatest obstacles that the EDC had to overcome in order to win acceptance
lay within the very country that proposed it: France.90
The EDC was therefore doomed to fail, and mostly because it was not a truly
European idea. It came largely as a response to the American desire to create a West
Germany that could help provide for its own defense.91 Indeed, the EDC was widely
perceived at the time as something which the United States was forcing upon France.92
However, its failure to become a reality did have real, positive benefits for the ECSC. It
took American eyes off of the ECSC for a time, allowing the Europeans to work through
the difficulties associated with its launch and establish it in the way that they saw fit. It
also gave French politicians the time they needed to work through their anti-German
sentiments and become accustomed to an integrated Europe built upon and centered
around West Germany’s tremendous economic potential.93
The historical record, then, clearly does not support Rosato’s claims with regard
to why the French sought to integrate Western Europe via the Schuman Plan. The
presence of the Soviet Union does seem to have instilled within the French a greater
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desire to see to it that Germany’s natural resources were tied permanently to Western
Europe, as it would have been disastrous if the Germans had turned toward the East and
added their incredible economic potential to the Soviet side. However, the historical
record also makes it clear that the French aspiration to rebuild and modernize their nation
as well as France’s troubled relationship with Germany played by far the most important
roles in convincing French leaders of the desirability of integration. The impetus for the
creation of the European Coal and Steel Community therefore cannot be accurately
characterized as being driven by balance-of-power politics, as it was World War II – and
not the Cold War – which played the decisive role in leading France to propose Western
European integration. After all, the danger posed by the Soviet Union appears to have
been solidified in the minds of Monnet and others by the Communist invasion of South
Korea, which occurred after the Schuman Declaration had been already made. Contrary
to the claims of Rosato, it is simply not the case that Monnet viewed the ECSC’s
principle virtue as being its ability to create a bloc that could effectively balance the
Soviet Union, and that this is what caused the French to endorse the Schuman Plan.94 It
seems that the Soviet Union may have indeed had a role to play in fostering the success
of early European integrative efforts in that it perhaps solidified French support for the
Schuman Declaration once it had been made, but it certainly does not seem to have been
critical to shaping French postwar plans for the future of the Continent.
The reasons why the West Germans enthusiastically accepted the Schuman Plan
when it was proposed in May 1950 are just as varied as those which are to be found on
the French side of the story. After it had been defeated by the Allied powers and offered
94
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its unconditional surrender in 1945, Germany was split into four zones: one controlled by
the United States, one by the United Kingdom, one by France, and the fourth by the
USSR. In addition, German industry was subject to severe output limits, reparations were
to be extracted from the country, and the German standard of living was capped. The
hope was that all of these requirements would make German resources available to the
rest of Europe for its reconstruction,95 with the expectation being that the four victorious
Allied powers would be able to work together to administer occupied Germany. Even
before the 1945 Potsdam Conference that had decreed these methods for dealing with
occupied Germany, however, Stalin had come to the conclusion that there would in fact
be “two Germanies.” This seemed only natural considering the fact that the Soviets
wished to impose a very different system on their portion of Germany from the one that
the Western powers sought to put in place in theirs.96 The Western powers accepted this
division of Germany as inevitable,97 and Secretary of State James Byrnes based his
negotiations as well as his understanding of the outcome of the conference on this idea.98
Other American officials either disagreed with or misunderstood Byrnes’
reasoning, however, and eventually American policy shifted toward the administration of
Germany as a single unit.99 Soviet unwillingness to run German foreign trade on an allGerman basis, however, meant that administering Germany in this manner was simply
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unfeasible, and the United States turned its attention toward the creation of a divided
Germany made up of the Communist East and the democratic West. This was, after all,
the obvious alternative to the failed policy of a reunified Germany. Britain quickly joined
its zone with that of the United States, but France would not commit itself to such an
overtly anti-Soviet policy for some time.100 Eventually, in 1948, after realizing that the
French zone might become isolated as the Anglo-American “Bizone” pursued its own
robust economic policies – some of which were detrimental to continued French recovery
and modernization – France agreed to discuss the possibility of trizonal fusion.101
Germany, then, was divided and being ruled over by foreign military
governments. As a result, getting out from under occupation by the Allies and being seen
as an equal within the international community were very important to the Germans.
Much of this desire stemmed from the living conditions that were present in occupied
Germany, as they were all but intolerable. Germany had been ravaged by an Allied
bombing policy that targeted houses and apartments in an effort to paralyze the German
economy and force a Nazi surrender. By the end of the war, over 50% – and in some
cities, as much as 80% – of prewar dwellings had been completely destroyed, with many
more being severely damaged. Hunger, homelessness, and cold took hold as the central
German authorities were no longer allowed to function in the wake of the Nazi
surrender.102 The lack of food for the population – each person was rationed about 1,000
calories per day – led to constant malnutrition. This malnutrition, in turn, reduced
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Germans’ ability to engage in meaningful work and contributed to an alarmingly rapid
spread of serious disease.103 In 1946, for example, there were an estimated 260,000 cases
of tuberculosis in the British zone alone.104 Additionally, the Allied Control Council in
Berlin was not functioning properly, and, as a result, “all the efforts made in
municipalities and even in entire occupation zones were bound to be fruitless.” Such
conditions not only caused unbearable living conditions for the German people but also
retarded economic recovery. This was perhaps felt most acutely in the British zone,
which contained the all-important Ruhr. The British occupation forces were, at least
according to one very prominent observer, “treating the population badly,”105 and the
British Military Government was having trouble mastering its work106 and administering
its zone properly.
As a result, the West German desire to regain a position of equality and take
control of German affairs should not be surprising. It should also not be surprising that
such considerations did a great deal to color West German policy after the creation of the
Federal Republic of Germany in 1949.107 Adenauer, the first Chancellor of West
Germany, viewed each arrangement that was made either by the Occupation government
or the newly-created West German government through the lens of the restoration of
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German equality and the furtherance of German development.108 His ultimate goal was to
have the numerous restrictions which had been placed on his country by the Potsdam
Declaration and Occupation Statute removed. These restrictions were numerous and farreaching, and included the areas of defense, foreign affairs, occupation costs, matters
relating to the federal and Land constitutions, reparations, foreign trade, exchange
controls, international borrowing, decartelization, and control over the Ruhr.109 In lifting
these restrictions, he desired to see his country become a valued member of the
international community that had regained the trust and support of its Western neighbors
and partners and was, as a result, no longer being occupied by foreign powers. To
Adenauer, the Council of Europe seemed to be a way in which West Germany might be
able to take a step toward this equality and “produce appreciable alleviations in the whole
field of the occupation regime.” He was convinced that, if West Germany joined the
Council of Europe, “the revision of the Occupation Statute…would be much more
generous,”110 and conditions might then improve for himself and his countrymen. This
goal of raising the standard of living not only in West Germany but across the war-torn
Continent was eventually included in the treaty establishing the ECSC itself:
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The European Coal and Steel Community shall have as its task to contribute…to
economic expansion, growth of employment and a rising standard of living in the
Member States.111
Convincing the newly-formed West German Bundestag to join the Council of Europe and
take the first step toward this goal would not be easy, however.
The Council of Europe, which was meant to be the political parallel to the
Organization for European Economic Cooperation that the U.S. had required for the
administration of Marshall Plan aid, was proposed by France out of a desire to see an
assembly set up for Europe. France believed that such an arrangement might give them
an opportunity to exercise some level of control over Germany112 while capturing the
German “political imagination” by presenting the country with an opportunity to have a
place and play a role in postwar Europe. It was also intended to gain the French some
cachet with the American government,113 which had been pushing for some level of
European integration since the end of the war.114 At the same time, however, France was
hoping that the Saar would be given independent membership in the Council of
Europe.115 France had, of course, essentially annexed the Saar with the Allies’ blessing116
after a favorable vote by the population of the Saar Landtag in 1947. This fusion of
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France and the Saar was enshrined in November of that year by the establishment of a
constitution for the Saar that instituted a monetary and customs union for the two areas.
While technically independent, the Saar clearly had a special relationship with France
that allowed France to have free access to the vast resources that were contained within it,
including coal. When the Federal Republic of Germany was created in 1949, however,
the population of the Saar became increasingly displeased with its decision to pursue
union with France, causing fear among the French that they may not be able to retain
their access to the Saar’s important resources. As a result, the French negotiated a new
convention which allowed them to maintain financial and customs authority in the Saar.
This convention also granted a long-term lease of the Saar mines to France, an action that
allowed the French to continue having access to the Saar resources117 that they, of course,
wanted for their Plan de Modernisation et Ré-équipment.
The Germans were predictably angry about these developments. Adenauer called
the new convention “a decision against Europe,”118 and the West German government
decided to delay its entry into the Council of Europe as a result of the new convention,
with the powerful Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) stating that it would
only vote in favor of German accession to the Council if the Saar did not join as well.119
The SPD was not the only party that threatened to keep West Germany out of the Council
of Europe as a result of France’s actions regarding the Saar, meaning that the Bundestag
simply would not vote to allow West Germany to join the Council of Europe if the Saar
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was given full membership, too,120 as this would acknowledge that the Saar fell outside of
the Federal Republic of Germany.121 German protests about the detachment of the Saar
from their country were rooted not only in the economic significance of that resource-rich
region, but also in the fact that the newly-agreed Saar conventions broke previous Allied
promises. The Allies had “maintained the position that a change in the frontiers of
Germany could only be made by the peace treaty,” which had not yet been signed at the
time. The Allied governments had, in fact, “repeatedly underlined this promise,”
according to Adenauer. The French takeover of the Saar and its valuable resources
therefore created a situation in which general German displeasure with the Allied powers
might increase and cause nationalist sentiments in Germany to flare up. Adenauer saw
that “the Saar question could become a dangerous explosive, a focus of agitation for
nationalist circles.”122 Many within the French government, however, seem to have
ignored this possibility, as they stated at the time that they would only agree to allow
West German membership in the Council of Europe if the Saar was permitted as a
member at the same time.123 France’s conduct over the Saar caused widespread doubts
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within Germany as to whether France seriously wanted to improve its relationship with
its old nemesis and allow Germany to regain its status as an equal and thereby assist in
the reconstruction of Western Europe.124
As a result, something had to be done about the Saar before European integration
could begin in earnest. The Schuman Plan was the answer. This plan provided the
possibility of solving the Saar issue by simply placing all of the coal and steel industries
of France, West Germany, and any other Western European country that wished to join
under supranational control. Such an arrangement would, of course, include the Saar,
meaning it would safeguard not only French, but also German access to the resources of
this vital region. The Saar question, then, would more or less “solve itself.” The Schuman
Plan also reinforced in the minds of many Germans – including Adenauer – that France
genuinely did want to pursue an understanding with its old enemy, and that it was not
opposed to cooperation with Germany. After all, the Germans viewed the ECSC proposal
itself as being “based on the principle of equality”125 among the nations of Western
Europe.
Once the Saar had been taken care of, West Germany was able to turn its attention
to joining the Council of Europe, a move which, again, the Germans hoped would afford
them a less burdensome Occupation Statute. To Adenauer, either “the passage of time or
some unforeseen event” would need to take place in order for the Bundestag to accept the
Council of Europe’s invitation to join. The Schuman Declaration provided this
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unforeseen event,126 and solved the problem of control over the Saar. “An essential
element of estrangement” between France and Germany had been removed, Adenauer
said,127 allowing West Germany to agree to join the Council of Europe no matter what the
status of the Saar was. Simply put, the Saar did not hold the significance that it did before
the Schuman Declaration. The German Bundestag, as a result, voted to accept the
Council of Europe’s invitation to join on June 15, 1950, by a vote of 220 to 152.128
The Schuman Declaration, therefore, seems to have come at the perfect time for
the West Germans. At a time when they desperately wanted to regain their independence
and get out from under the misery of the Allied Occupation, joining the Council of
Europe seemed to them to be the first meaningful step that they could take toward the
realization of these goals. The Saar, however, created a conflict between France and
Germany that was making West German accession to the Council impossible. The
Schuman Declaration effectively solved this problem for the Germans by safeguarding
their access to the Saar’s critical resources no matter what the status of the Saar would
end up being. The integration of the coal and steel industries of Western Europe was seen
as desirable by the West Germans largely because it would allow them to settle their
dispute with France over the Saar and take the first step on the long road to the recovery
of their sovereignty. Far from being “obsessed” with the power of the Soviet Union as
Rosato claims,129 it is clear that Adenauer’s decision to endorse the creation of the ECSC
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was driven instead by a desire to regain independence for West Germany. Here again, the
critical role that World War II played in the integration of Western Europe through the
creation of the European Coal and Steel Community becomes clear, as it was this war
which had stripped Germany of its sovereignty in the first place. Without World War II,
then, West Germany may not have been willing to embrace supranationalism in the
manner in which it did in 1950.
Despite the occupation of Germany by the Allies after the war, France and other
European countries still harbored concerns about the possibility of future German
aggression. As demonstrated above, this was an important reason why the French decided
to propose the coal and steel pool outlined in the Schuman Plan. These concerns were not
totally misplaced, as nationalism had not completely gone away after the unconditional
surrender of Nazi Germany.130 This became clear as the 1940s came to a close, with farright political parties showing up in West Germany in late 1948 and early 1949. Some of
these groups believed that they could restore Germany’s former glory by reinstating the
“good” parts of National Socialism.131 The reasons for this resurgence of extreme
nationalism were many and varied. As time went by and the country began to recover
economically, Germans began to lose their desire to “forget…that they were Germans”
because of the horrors of the war and the total collapse of Nazi Germany. Indeed, the
gradual recovery of West Germany instilled within many Germans a pride in their
nation’s technical skill and incredible economic potential, and, as living conditions
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slowly improved, people had more time to think about their perceived mistreatment at the
hand of the Allied Occupation regime.132 Part of this mistreatment included perhaps
unsurprisingly the creation of the International Authority for the Ruhr, a development
which stripped Germany of its control over its most important industrial resource and
thereby increased nationalist feeling. The Soviets played a role in the increase in German
nationalism as well, though, in that the 1948 Berlin blockade was seen as an attack on all
of Germany, not just Berlin.133 The presence of such a seemingly obvious danger served
to bring Germans together and increase their nationalist sentiments. The splitting of
Germany into East and West also bolstered German nationalism, as it represented the
division of their great nation and provided them with another national grievance. No
matter what the source of their nationalism, though, all nationalist Germans seemed to
share a few things in common: pride in the powerful Wehrmacht of World War II, scorn
for the occupying powers, some degree of anti-Semitism, and a “strong belief that
Germany [could] again grow great as the leader of Europe.”134 By the summer of 1949,
the Allies – particularly the British and the Americans in Bavaria – believed that they
were “losing control” of the populations in their zones as they became less cooperative
with and increasingly antagonistic toward the Occupation governments.135
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The fledgling West German government understood, however, that a key part of
ending the occupation of their country and regaining independence and equality was the
alleviation of French and wider European security concerns136 driven by a fear of a new
manifestation of militant German nationalism. They recognized that, in order for West
Germany to regain its place in the community of nations, it would have to convince its
neighbors that it would not act aggressively toward them in the future. Adenauer,
accepting that the French viewed “German steel production as war potential,”137 believed
in early March 1950 that some sort of economic merger between the two nations would
go a long way toward assuaging French security concerns vis-à-vis Germany. He stated
that the creation of a customs union between France and West Germany would “cause the
rivalry of the two countries to disappear.”138 Further, he believed that such an
arrangement would
be a big step forward if Frenchmen and Germans sat in one house and at one table
in order to work together and to carry joint responsibility. The psychological
consequences would be inestimable. French security demands could be
satisfied…[and] the understanding that would grow between Germany and France
on this basis would be even more significant than all the economic advantages
that would undoubtedly accrue.139
As indicated above, the French recognized the security benefits of such an
arrangement as well, so when the Schuman Declaration was made in May 1950,
Adenauer quickly confirmed his interest in the proposal. The Schuman Plan did, after all,
give both France and West Germany a concrete way to enact the type of union that
136
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Adenauer had envisioned, and in a manner that was pleasing to the French. Like
Schuman, Adenauer thought that a coal and steel pool specifically would be particularly
beneficial for easing French fears:
There was good reason for projecting such a scheme for iron, steel and coal if the
goal was to do away with the differences that had for centuries existed between
the French people and the German people. There was no better way of dispelling
French doubts about the German people’s love of peace than to bring together the
two countries’ production of coal, iron and steel, which were always the mainstay
of rearmament, so that each partner in this pact would know everything that was
happening in this important sphere. I declared my conviction that the whole
German people desired for the future a removal of all psychological inhibitions
between France and Germany so that at long last peace should prevail in
Europe.140
The ECSC, therefore, provided a way in which French nerves could be calmed and
German equality could be brought nearer, as it gave the French a way to constantly keep
an eye on what the Germans were up to, no matter how out of control their nationalism
seemed to be getting.
The new West German government shared this desire to prevent German
nationalism from continuing to develop. Indeed, the men who made up this government
were just as capable as any other European of remembering the horrors of Nazi Germany
and World War II. They had seen the consequences of unbridled German nationalism
firsthand, and were aware of the fact that they simply could not let nationalism go
unchecked in the Federal Republic of Germany as the 1940s ended and a new decade
began. As an occupied state that was striving to regain its equality, the Germans had to
worry about how they were perceived by other countries, and Adenauer recognized that
bouts of out-of-control nationalism would not do anything to gain the trust of Nazi
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Germany’s victims, even if it was thought that the most violent possible manifestations of
this nationalism could be kept in check by the European Coal and Steel Community. He
also feared the detrimental impact that resurgent nationalism would have on the stability
of the young West German state. Extra-parliamentary nationalist groups led by popular
demagogues appeared particularly dangerous to Adenauer in this regard.141 The Soviet
Union entered Adenauer’s calculations as well, as the possibility that German nationalists
might end up turning towards the USSR for support because of how the Allies were
treating West Germany seemed to him to be a very real danger.142 This fear of a Sovietdominated Germany was shared by many in the West, though, who thought that a West
Germany that came under the control of far-right nationalists might pursue unification
with East Germany and form some level of union with the Soviets.143 The Allied decision
to allow France to essentially annex the Saar seemed particularly salient in this regard, as
it led to a great deal of anger and annoyance with the Allies and the West among
Germans144 for the reasons outlined above. Indeed, two of the ministers in Adenauer’s
own government were making public speeches that seemed to support German
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nationalism with regard to the Saar in early 1950, meaning action needed to be taken
quickly by the Adenauer government to prevent German nationalism from peaking within
the country.145
As was the case with regard to French security concerns, some type of FrancoGerman economic merger seemed to be the answer to Adenauer in March 1950. He
thought that such a development would allow German nationalism to be brought under
control and prevented from getting out of hand146 because it would go a long way toward
resolving the aforementioned issues that were driving Germans to embrace excessive
nationalism. It would also allow Germany to take the first steps towards equality and
independence, a condition which Adenauer believed would cause “radical tendencies in
Germany…to collapse and become an insignificant fraction of public opinion” as
Germany was brought “back to an honourable place in the family of free peoples.” Such a
development would also give Germany access to the resources that it needed to pursue
economic growth and the alleviation of very difficult postwar living conditions. Such a
development, according to Adenauer, would help eradicate the nationalism that was
taking hold in his country because “radicalism was to a large extent the bitter fruit of
post-war distress.”147 When the Schuman Declaration came along, then, he was quick to
embrace it, as it provided a concrete method for solving the German nationalism issue.
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This was critical if the Adenauer government wanted to see an internally-stable West
Germany that was able to assuage the fears of its neighbors while resisting the pull of
unification at the expense of falling into the Soviet sphere of influence.
As with the French side of the story, then, it is clear that Rosato’s balance-ofpower argument simply is not supported by the historical record. Instead, the West
German reasons for accepting the French suggestion to create a supranational coal and
steel pool in Western Europe were multidimensional and did not simply reflect an
overwhelming desire to balance the Soviet Union. They were also much different from
the reasons why the French decided to put forth the Schuman Plan. In addition to
recognizing that it would solve the problem of the Saar and allow them to join the
Council of Europe, the West Germans believed that the creation of the European Coal
and Steel Community would help to assuage French fears of future German aggression. It
was also seen as a way to prevent German nationalism from getting out of control, as this
would be disastrous not only for West Germany but for all of Western Europe,
particularly if it caused Germany to reunify and fall into the Soviet sphere of influence.
The obvious overarching goal that drove all of these motivations was the West German
desire to regain the sovereignty that it had lost when Nazi Germany unconditionally
surrendered to the Allies in 1945. Here again, then, the critical importance of World War
II to the European integration narrative becomes clear. While the threat of Soviet
influence in Germany certainly seems to have been on the minds of West German
statesmen, the conditions created in West Germany in the aftermath of the war were
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much more important, meaning the Germans’ desire to pursue the integration of Western
Europe simply cannot be attributed solely – or even predominantly – to a desire to
balance the power of the Soviet Union.
Not every policy elite in France and West Germany supported the idea of placing
the coal and steel resources and industries of Western Europe under the supranational
control of the European Coal and Steel Community, however. In France, while “people
imagine retrospectively that the government and Parliament enthusiastically welcomed
the idea of an Iron and Steel Pool,” Bidault states that “this is far from true, although
some of the men who opposed it then later became supporters of the plan.” For proof that
the Schuman Plan ran into trouble, he cites the fact that the Schuman Declaration took
place on May 9, 1950, but that it was not until December 13, 1951, that the French
Chamber of Deputies actually ratified the Schuman Plan.148 According to him, there were
many reasons why French members of parliament opposed the Schuman Plan:
Some were concerned about their personal interests, others disapproved of the
European Community in principle, and there were some who just found any
change suspect. They made many speeches against the Plan, some of which were
very clever, others merely emotional.149
Indeed, the idea to place the coal and steel resources of Western Europe under
supranational authority had to overcome significant obstacles in France.
The opposition to the Schuman Plan in the French government came from the
Communists and the Gaullists, on the far Left and the far Right, respectively. The former
stated that the ECSC was a “vast plan to deport workers, who are looked on as cattle or
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mere merchandise to be sold abroad,” and the latter prophesied that a plan like the ECSC
meant that, “All customs barriers will fall, and the whole French market, from Strasbourg
to Brazzaville in the Congo, will be inundated by the dynamism of German industry.”150
Sovereignty concerns were also important to the Gaullists, who on December 6, 1951,
formally declared their opposition to the Schuman Plan on the basis that it placed the
management of French coal and steel in the hands of “an uncontrolled authority without
democratic responsibility.”151 Retaining the advantages that France had gained with the
Allied victory in World War II seems to have been important to the Gaullists as well.
According to General Charles de Gaulle, after his government left power in France in
1945,
Everything I had accomplished by dint of arduous efforts, as regards the
independence, the status and the interests of France, was immediately
jeopardized. Lacking the drive and energy thanks to which we were on our feet,
the regime was to all intents and purposes concerned with pleasing others.
Naturally enough, it found the required ideologies to camouflage this selfeffacement: the one, in the name of European unity, liquidating all the advantages
which victory had gained us…152
While the opposition of these groups never made up a parliamentary majority in France
and the Treaty of Paris ended up being ratified by the Chamber of Deputies153 and the
Senate by large majorities, Monnet nevertheless believed that “there could be no
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doubt…that the concerted nationalism of Left and Right would form a constant barrier to
Europe’s progress.”154 The European project would go ahead in France, but not without
facing the opposition of some French policy elites.
West Germany faced much the same issue when it came to the ratification of the
Schuman Plan. There, Kurt Schumacher’s SPD pledged to oppose the creation of the
ECSC.155 Calling Adenauer the “Chancellor of the Allies,” Schumacher opposed any
effort to integrate West Germany into the West. This included the ECSC, which he
derided as a scheme to keep Germany weak, divided, and under capitalist domination.
Instead of recognizing as Adenauer did that the Schuman Plan would help West Germany
achieve equality within the international community, he believed instead that it would, in
fact, deny West Germany the equality and sovereignty that it desired.156 He also believed
that Adenauer’s policies were generally meant to place West Germany under the control
of “a reactionary international coalition…between the Roman Catholic Church and
Western industrialists.” He thought that such an arrangement “not only threatened the
establishment of a truly democratic (i.e. socialist) Germany, but would revive strong
authoritarian, anti-capitalist, and radical nationalist sentiments.” The ECSC, to
Schumacher, belonged among the group of Adenauer policies which would lead to this
destabilizing outcome.157 Finally, Schumacher claimed that each new agreement that
West Germany entered into made it more difficult for the two halves of Germany to be
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reunited,158 a notion which was probably true, and which flew in the face of
Schumacher’s preferred policy of reuniting Germany even at the risk of offending the
Western powers. As he and many of his deputies were natives of either East Germany or
Berlin, such a goal is perhaps not surprising.159 The probability of reuniting Germany
under conditions which favored the West – a prerequisite as long as the Western Allies
occupied West Germany – was likely a pipe dream by the time of the Schuman
Declaration, however. In the end, the SPD’s opposition to the Schuman Plan simply was
not enough to block the ratification of the Treaty of Paris,160 largely because Schumacher
had lost the support of Germany’s biggest labor union, which supported and actively
negotiated for the acceptance of the Schuman Plan in the Bundestag.161
It was not only within the ranks of the French and German parliaments that
opposition to the creation of the ECSC surfaced. The industrialists of not only France and
West Germany but the other four initial member states of the ECSC – Italy, Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Luxembourg – expressed opposition to the Schuman Plan as well. In
February 1951, the industrialists of the Six mounted a concerted effort to oppose the
Schuman Plan’s supranational elements, which they asserted constituted “a framework
for a super-managed economy depriving the responsible owners of all initiative and
making them a mere ‘conveying belt’ for super-government control.” Further, they
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believed it was ultimately a move “toward enforced nationalization.”162 In all six nations,
the industrialists wanted to retain their ability to decide on prices and production,
something which was supposed to pass to the ECSC’s executive High Authority.163
Additionally, they sought to retain some degree of control over the management and
futures of their enterprises and wanted the treaty establishing the ECSC to include
mechanisms which would allow for its modification in the future.164 Eventually, the
industrialists in the all-important Ruhr agreed, at the urging of Monnet, Adenauer, and
U.S. High Commissioner for Germany John J. McCloy,165 to support the Schuman Plan,
albeit with some reservations. With the assent of these exceptionally powerful so-called
“Ruhr Barons,” it became possible for West Germany and the rest of the Six to sign the
Treaty of Paris on April 18, 1951.166
In sum, it is clear from the historical record that one simply cannot point to a
desire to balance the power of the Soviet Union in order to accurately explain why the
Europeans pursued the integration of the Continent in the aftermath of World War II.
Instead, it was this horrific war that created the conditions in Western Europe that led to
the French proposal and German acceptance of the Schuman Plan. The reconstruction
and modernization of France, the assuagement of French security concerns, the end of the
Allied Occupation regime and the restoration of West German sovereignty, and the
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prevention of another bout of out-of-control German nationalism were the goals which
were seen as being served by the pooling of Western Europe’s coal and steel industries.
The reasons why France and West Germany pursued the creation of the ECSC were,
therefore, many and varied, meaning the narrative provided by the historical record is
much more complicated than the one provided by Rosato. The Soviet Union certainly had
a role to play in the eventual success of the ECSC, but it is, in fact, the relationship
between France and Germany in the aftermath of World War II that takes center stage in
this story, as the drive toward the creation of a unified Europe had already begun when
the French fully recognized the potential threat that the USSR posed to Western Europe
in 1950.
The significance of this understanding of the genesis of European integration is
clear. While the Soviet Union has indeed ceased to exist and is no longer a threat to
Western Europe, this does not mean that the unraveling of European integration is
inevitable. Instead, since the reasons why France and Germany pursued integration were
predominantly related to the outcome of World War II and, critically, their relationship
with each other, the dissolution of the Soviet Union has very little to do with an accurate
understanding of or prediction regarding European unity. In France, the overriding
concerns in the postwar era were French recovery and German aggression, and it was
these goals that led French policy elites to embrace Western European integration. French
control over German resources and the ability hold the Germans down and ensure they
would not initiate another war were critical parts of addressing of these issues. The Soviet
Union does seem to have had a role to play in the success of the proposed Schuman Plan,
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but after it had been agreed upon, meaning that a desire to balance the power of the
Soviet Union did not play into the initial French decision to propose integration. The
Germans, on the other hand, desired the return of independence and normalcy to their
state, meaning their actions were not driven by the presence or power of the Soviets,
either. They knew that it would take a great deal of time and effort for them to reestablish
German sovereignty, and the creation of the ECSC was seen as the first step toward the
realization of this goal.
France and West Germany saw their respective national interests as being served
by the creation of the ECSC, then, and, as long as these states’ modern-day incarnations
believe that their interests are still being served by their continued participation in an
integrated Europe, they are highly likely to keep supporting it. Indeed, even though the
goals being pursued by these states when they set up the ECSC were generally
accomplished long ago, that does not mean that integration cannot continue to be
beneficial to them. States’ interests are apt to evolve over time, but that does not
necessarily prompt them to radically alter their entrenched institutional associations. The
most powerful Continental leaders seem to understand this and also seem to believe that
retaining their EU membership is currently in their respective states’ best interests, as
former French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel
recently proposed a deeper fiscal integration of the eurozone countries in a bid to find a
permanent solution to the European debt crisis. This proposal included greater restrictions
on taxation and spending, with automatic penalties for states that break the rules.167
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European leaders have also agreed upon the creation of a €700 billion firewall for the
Continent that will provide financial stability going into the future,168 and European
finance ministers have agreed to allow the European Union to scrutinize eurozone
members’ budgets before they are approved by their respective national parliaments.169
Merkel has also presented a vision of Europe that has a much more federal structure, with
the EU making strides toward becoming the Continent’s central government.170 These
developments obviously fly in the face of Rosato’s notion that the dissolution or
weakening of the union ought to be expected in the post-Cold War security
environment.171 Furthermore, as these proposals to deepen European integration have
come about as a result of the economic problems that Europe is currently experiencing,
Rosato’s belief that economic problems should cause Europe’s “fraying” to accelerate172
appears to be incorrect.

168

Ian Traynor, “Eurozone Ministers Agree €500bn in New Bailout Funds,” The Guardian,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/mar/30/eurozone-ministers-500bn-bailout (accessed April 7,
2012).
169

Stanley Pignal, “EU Beefs Up Powers over State Budgets,” Financial Times,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/07034eda-5ca6-11e1-8f1f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1muTlwMGp (accessed
April 11, 2012).
170

“Merkel Resolved to Bring Europe out of Crisis, Though Cool to Big Boost for Bailout Fund,” The
Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/markets/davos-business-leaders-say-westerncapitalism-has-widened-income-gap-wonder-if-it-can-survive/2012/01/25/gIQA1sD2PQ_story.html
(accessed January 25, 2012).
“Merkel Deflects Calls for Bigger Euro Zone Firewall,” Reuters,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/25/us-davos-merkel-idUSTRE80O1TW20120125 (accessed
January 25, 2012).
171

Rosato, 48.

172

ibid., 83.

56

Ultimately, Rosato’s ideas are built upon an incorrect reading of history. The
historical record makes it clear that the original goals of the European politicians who
pursued the union of their Continent were largely state centric, with each state focused
predominantly on its own individual economic and political interests. The French desired
the integration of the Continent mostly because it would give them unfettered access to
German resources, allowing them to continue their postwar reconstruction efforts while
holding down and closely monitoring West Germany. The Germans, on the other hand,
agreed to the French proposal for integration principally because they believed it would
serve their overarching goal of regaining sovereignty, equality, and their place in Europe.
These states were clearly pursuing Continental unification primarily because they
believed that that was what was best for their respective countries as they moved forward
in the wake of World War II. Rather than taking the fact that EU member states flout
European laws and norms as a sign that the integration of Western Europe was driven by
the Cold War, as Rosato has done,173 such malfeasance should simply be viewed as a
continuation of the state-centric, national interest-driven policies of France and West
Germany that were so prominently displayed in the earliest days of European unification.
Advanced European political and military unions meant to move completely beyond
intergovernmentalism and shape the Continent into some type of super-state were never
inevitabilities, as these were not the original purposes of European integration. The
French and the West Germans were indeed willing to surrender some of their sovereignty
to the supranational European Coal and Steel Community, but only because they believed
they would be reaping very valuable benefits for their individual states as a result.
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Rosato, however, has misunderstood the interests that the Europeans believed
were being served by the genesis of European integration. He asserts that a group of
minor powers that is attempting to balance a great power will pursue an integrated
military establishment as well as a central authority,174 causing him to mistakenly believe
that the fact that full-blown political and military unions have not been forthcoming on
the Continent in the post-Cold War era is due to the Soviet Union’s collapse. This is not
the case. As Rosato himself argues, advanced political and military unions were
eschewed both during the Cold War175 as well as after it.176 This indicates that the
presence or absence of the Soviet threat has had little bearing on whether or not Europe
has pursued these types of deeper integration. Simply put, if the European Union decides
to break up or, more likely, pursue further integration in the future, it will be because the
most important EU member states see such a course of action as being in their respective
states’ best interests and not simply because the Soviet Union crumbled in 1991.
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Three
American Contributions
The historical record makes it very plain that the United States played a critical
role in the successful establishment of an integrated Western Europe. The U.S. emerged
from World War II as the most powerful country in the world, with enough might and
capital to approach the Continent in essentially whatever manner it chose. Europe, on the
other hand, had experienced unprecedented destruction during the war, placing the U.S.
in the position to have a tremendous amount of influence over the affairs of Western
Europe in the postwar period. After some initial debate within the U.S. regarding how to
deal with the vanquished Germany, it became clear to the Truman administration that this
nation held a position of central importance to the future of Europe, as its great natural
resources and industrial potential were seen as critical to the reconstruction of the
Continent. As a result, the encouragement of European integration became official
American policy. With its power and influence brought to bear on the situation, the U.S.
was able to not only do a great deal to encourage the Europeans to pursue integration,
but, just as importantly, it was able to create the type of security situation that was
necessary to assuage French concerns about a reindustrialized and no longer occupied
Germany. Further, after the Dwight Eisenhower administration took office, a great deal

59

was done to ensure that the fledgling European Coal and Steel Community would be able
to successfully get off the ground. As a result, the contribution of the United States to the
genesis of European integration was essential. Further, as the following pages will make
clear, the notion expressed by Rosato that U.S. encouragement was neither sufficient nor
necessary for the successful implementation of European integration177 is simply not
supported by the historical record.
The struggle over how to approach the defeated Nazi Germany began in the
United States even before the war had come to an end. As the country which was to
escape from the war with the least destruction and most power, it fell very naturally to the
U.S. to take the lead in deciding the postwar order. In 1944, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt created a Cabinet-level committee, made up of Secretary of State Cordell Hull,
Secretary of War Henry Stimson, and Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, to
consider precisely how Germany ought to be dealt with.178 Morgenthau, for his part,
believed that Germany would have to be treated extremely harshly in order to prevent it
from initiating another conflict with its neighbors.179
In a memorandum which was given to Roosevelt and brought to the 1944 United
States-United Kingdom conference in Quebec, Morgenthau suggested that Germany
should be totally stripped of its armaments, its armament industry, and any other industry
that might be used for the creation of military strength. To do this, he thought that the
Saar should be annexed by France while the Ruhr was “not only stripped of all presently
177
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existing industries but so weakened and controlled that it can not in the foreseeable future
become an industrial area.” Additionally, Morgenthau said,
Within a short period, if possible not longer than 6 months after the cessation of
hostilities, all industrial plants and equipment not destroyed by military action
shall be completely dismantled and transported to Allied Nations as restitution.
All equipment shall be removed from the mines and the mines closed.180
Finally, the Morgenthau Plan would have sent the entire German labor force to work on
farms, a program which would have offered “security to [the U.S.] as well as food for
Germany and her neighbors.” He recognized that his plan would “involve hardship and
hard work for several years” and that there would “be considerable unemployment in the
difficult transition period.”181 This did not seem to bother him, though, as he told his
chief assistant, “I don’t care what happens to the population [of Germany].”182
In September 1944, Roosevelt accepted the Morgenthau Plan for Germany,183 and
forced British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to sign onto it at the aforementioned
Quebec conference.184 Fortunately, though, no firm arrangement was ever put in place to
implement the destructive and shortsighted Morgenthau Plan,185 and Roosevelt eventually
let it drop in order to prevent his Cabinet from becoming irreconcilably divided.186 Hull
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and Stimson did, after all, strongly disagree with Morgenthau’s ideas, causing American
and therefore wider Allied work on how to deal with postwar Germany to stall. Unlike
Morgenthau, the Secretaries of State and War recognized that Germany occupied a key
place in Europe’s economy, as it provided not only a great deal of manufacturing
potential but also a significant market for the goods of its neighbors.187 Stimson argued
further that Germany’s incredible industrial potential should be kept intact and made
available for use by Europe as a whole as it sought to rebuild itself after the war. The
internationalization of the Ruhr, he thought, might be a way in which this could be
accomplished.188 In the end, Roosevelt changed his mind on the Morgenthau Plan and
placed American planning for postwar Germany in the hands of Hull and Stimson alone,
removing Morgenthau from his Cabinet committee all together.189 Germany’s vast
industrial potential was simply too important to the Continent for it to be destroyed. On
April 12, 1945, however, Roosevelt passed away, leaving Vice President Harry Truman
to ultimately decide along with the Allies how best to deal with postwar Germany.
Despite the Roosevelt administration’s eventual recognition that Germany was
important to the recovery of Europe, the Truman administration did not initially fully
grasp how dependent the recovery of Europe truly was on the recovery of Germany. 190
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This was made clear, though, after the brutal European winter of 1946-1947, the worst in
a century. Rail and barge traffic was brought to a halt and industrial production was
interrupted for weeks at a time by the unusually harsh weather.191 Worse yet, the bitter
winter combined with subsequent floods and droughts “which cut Western Europe’s
grain crop to the lowest figure in generations.”192 Hunger and disease spread quickly
throughout the Continent, and there were rising concerns that the distress being felt in
Western European countries would cause the populations there to turn toward
Communism for relief.193 The war had, quite simply, done more damage than the
Americans realized,194 and the recovery process was extremely fragile.195 In early 1947,
many prominent individuals within the American government realized that something
had to be done to help Europe get back on its feet. There was no specific plan in place
when Secretary of State George Marshall announced the United States’ intention to assist
the European recovery on June 5, 1947,196 however, as it had not been until the Moscow
Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in the spring of 1947 that Marshall had decided to
announce what would later become known as the Marshall Plan.197
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In his private talks with Stalin during the Moscow Council, Marshall realized that
the Soviets understood the impact that the conditions in Europe were having and sensed
that they wanted to intentionally delay the recovery of the Continent. This was because
Stalin knew, like many in the West, that the Communists in Western Europe would
benefit politically from chaos and rapidly deteriorating living conditions.198 Truman
asserted further that
the communists have announced determined opposition to any effort to help
Europe get back on its feet. There will unquestionably be further incitements to
strike, not for the purpose of redressing the legitimate grievances of particular
groups, but for the purpose of bringing chaos in the hope that it will pave the way
for totalitarian control.199
The Soviets were simply not negotiating in good faith, and Marshall realized that either
the United States would have to give up on Europe or work toward completing the
recovery of the Continent on its own.200 The Truman administration chose the latter, and
the Marshall Plan was the result. The American focus remained on Germany, though,
where the U.S. was an occupying power with “major responsibilities”201 and the
industrial heart of Europe lay. As former President Herbert Hoover put it after going to
Germany on an official government mission in February 1947, “We can keep Germany in
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these economic chains but it will also keep Europe in rags.”202 Simply put, if the U.S.
wanted to prevent the Soviets from making headway in Western Europe, the
reconstruction of the continent was a necessity, and if this were to happen, Germany
would have to be revitalized.203
Balance-of-power politics, then, may have determined the manner in which the
Truman administration approached the Continent. The Americans clearly recognized that
the Communists in Western Europe were able to benefit from the economic malaise that
had gripped that part of Europe since the end of World War II, and that, in order to
prevent them from gaining a foothold in that region, reconstruction would have to be
quick and complete. While Rosato may attempt to argue that, as a result, the entirety of
the drive to integrate Western Europe through the creation of the ECSC can be boiled
down to balance-of-power thinking, such sentiments would be misplaced. Rosato argues,
for one thing, that the Americans’ contribution to the integration of Western Europe was
largely immaterial, meaning that, by extension, the motivations held by the United States
would also have to be immaterial. However, despite the critical role that the American
contribution to the creation of the ECSC played in reality, this contribution facilitated
rather than motivated the Europeans’ actions, meaning the Americans’ reasons for
supporting the Europeans as they sought a unified Continent do not, by necessity, have
any bearing on the Europeans’ motivations for doing so. While the Americans’
motivations for assisting the Continent are, indeed, perhaps best described as being
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driven by balance-of-power considerations, this is fundamentally different from claiming
that the Europeans sought to integrate Western Europe because they were attempting to
balance against the Soviet Union. One cannot take the motivations of the United States
government and impose them upon the European policy elites that were involved simply
because both groups sought the same outcome.
The Truman administration believed that in order for the reconstruction of Europe
to be successful, it would have to involve more than American assistance to the
Continent. Instead, the administration envisioned the creation of a unified Europe with
the industrial resources of Germany at its center. John Foster Dulles, who accompanied
Marshall on his trip to the Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers as a special advisor,
made statements along these lines in a speech that he gave on January 17, 1947. In it, he
stated that the tremendous industrial potential of Western Germany should be integrated
into Western Europe, as such an arrangement would provide a check against future
German aggression while creating a more stable and prosperous Western Europe. The
wisdom of these ideas was accepted by the Americans after the unsuccessful Moscow
Council, which had solidified in their minds the fact that the German problem was really
at the heart of the European problem and that it simply could not be settled outside of a
European framework of some kind.204 As Truman put it,
European recovery is essentially a problem for the nations of Europe. It was
therefore apparent that it could not be solved, even with outside aid, unless the
European nations themselves would find a joint solution and accept joint
responsibility for its execution. Such a cooperative plan would release the full
productive resources of Europe and provide a proper basis for measuring the need
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and effectiveness of further aid from outside Europe, and in particular from the
United States.205
Ultimately, Truman believed that “Europe had to be rehabilitated by the people who
destroyed it.”206 The United States could not do it on its own, and it could not do it while
dealing with a fragmented Continent.
In 1947, others in the American government echoed the idea that Europe would
have to become unified if it were to recover properly. On March 21 of that year, both the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Relations
passed a resolution which stated that, “Resolved by the Senate (the House of
Representatives concurring) that the Congress favors the creation of a United States of
Europe.” The day before his June 5 speech at Harvard announcing the Marshall Plan,
Marshall himself responded to this Congressional resolution. In a letter to Arthur
Vandenberg, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Marshall
asserted that there was a fundamental difference between what the Truman administration
was trying to accomplish and what the Congress was trying to accomplish. While he was
“deeply sympathetic toward the general objective of the [Congressional] resolution,” he
asserted that the initiative for the unification of Europe had to come from Europe. It could
not be forced upon them by the United States, as Marshall believed the Congress wished
to do.207 This was an important point, and one which both the Truman and Eisenhower
administrations held to during their years in office. Both of these presidents, while
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desiring to see the integration of Europe and believing that the United States had a critical
role to play in this process, understood that the impetus for such a development had to
come from the Europeans themselves, particularly the French.208 Regardless of these
differences between the White House and Congress, however, the overall objective – the
integration of Europe – was the same, and the Foreign Assistance Act, which put the
ideas behind the Marshall Plan into law, reflected this goal:
Mindful of the advantages which the U.S. has enjoyed through the existence of a
large domestic market with no internal trade barriers, and believing that similar
advantages can accrue to the countries of Europe, it is declared to be the policy of
the people of the U.S. to encourage these countries through a joint organization to
exert sustained common efforts…which will speedily achieve that economic
cooperation in Europe which is essential for lasting peace and prosperity.209
The Marshall Plan was therefore clearly meant to lay the foundation for a unified
Europe210 that would be less prone to initiate another devastating war or fall into the orbit
of the Soviet Union and more capable of increasing its industrial production and pulling
itself out of the postwar quagmire that it had found itself in.
In order for the Marshall Plan to accomplish these goals, the Truman
administration believed that France had to be on board with it. Indeed, the administration
saw France as the very “lynchpin” of the plan.211 The French, on the other hand, were
extremely wary of the war-making potential of a reindustrialized Germany, particularly
208
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one that was no longer being occupied by the Allies.212 In the immediate aftermath of the
war, the French wished to see the creation of a largely dismembered Germany, although
not to the almost unfathomable extent that Morgenthau had envisioned in 1944.
Crucially, they wanted to see a decentralized and permanently occupied Germany213 with
the Ruhr and the Saar – the most important industrial areas of Germany –
internationalized214 and taken over by France, respectively.215 The United States, then,
needed to convince France to accept the full-scale reindustrialization of Germany in order
for the Marshall Plan to be effective and Western Europe to recover. The aid that the
Marshall Plan promised to France in 1947 went some way toward accomplishing this for
the Americans, as the French themselves saw the Marshall Plan as a way to purchase
their assent to German reconstruction.216 Indeed, Marshall Plan aid probably did a great
deal to help convince the French over the next few years to accept American policy
positions with regard to Germany, as France became heavily dependent upon it for the
continuation of the Plan de Modernisation et Ré-équipment. By 1949, 90 percent of the
Monnet Plan’s resources came from Marshall Plan aid,217 meaning France relied at that
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point almost completely on American assistance as it attempted to reconstruct and
modernize its most important industries. This assistance, as a result, simply had to keep
flowing into France.
While the Marshall Plan helped bring the French a step closer to accepting the full
reindustrialization of Germany, they nevertheless held onto other demands that they
believed would further their security against the Germans. One of these demands was, of
course, the internationalization of the Ruhr that was proposed at the 1948 London
Conference on Germany.218 Just over a week before the London Conference began,
French Ambassador to the United States Henri Bonnet called Under Secretary of State
Robert Lovett in order to “reiterate the importance which his Government attached to
reaching agreement at London on…international control of Ruhr production.”219 The
United States had been willing to accept international control of Ruhr resources since at
least 1947,220 as the Truman administration understood how critical these resources were
to wider Western European recovery after the war.221 It was concerned, however, about
how such a move would be received in Germany, where nationalism was on the rise as
the 1940s came to a close.222 As a result, Marshall, less than a week before the London
Conference began, sent a telegram to Lewis Douglas, the American Ambassador to the
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United Kingdom, giving him some “general background and guidance” for the upcoming
conference. In it, Marshall stated,
The necessary restrictions on German control of [the] Ruhr which may result from
an international agreement with respect to [the] control of Ruhr resources would
be much more acceptable to [the] Germans if it embodies a contribution on their
part to a larger Western European Union, to [the] realization of which other
Western European countries will also be making substantial contributions of one
kind or another.
The German solution, then, according to Marshall,
had a two-fold aspect: (a) economic and political reorientation of Germans,
fostered by [the] common policies of Western occupation powers; and (b)
integration of Western Germany into [the] Western European community.223
Douglas brought these guidelines to the London Conference when it began on
February 26. Two days later, after the French had formally proposed the
internationalization of the Ruhr, Douglas
stressed US sympathy with [the] principle [that] access to Ruhr products should
not be exclusively controlled by Germany and readiness [to] consider proposals
for long-term control [of the] Ruhr in [the] post-occupation period.
He also said that he
would hope, however, [that] such control would be of such [a] nature that
Western Germany and Western Europe would be effectively integrated and [that
it] would not be punitive so as to create conditions in Germany which we all
desire to avoid and which would increase [the] bargaining power of [the] Soviet
[Union] in Germany. While realizing [that] international control would have to set
at rest [the] fear of Germany’s western neighbors, [it is] also important that it
have [the] effect of making [the] German people feel part of Western Europe
instead of turning them to [the] east. [The] US [has] attached very great
importance to economic integration [in] Western Europe. Therefore very
tentatively and very informally, he wanted to suggest that [an] international
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regime might look toward inclusion [of] not only [the] Ruhr but also similar
industrial regions of Western Europe.224
While affirming the Truman administration’s desire to see the Ruhr resources made
available to the entirety of Western Europe, Douglas’ comments stressed that France and
the rest of the Allies ought to be wary of the potential unintended consequences if such a
move were made in an exceptionally punitive manner. Indeed, the administration thought
it would be wiser to create some sort of larger framework that all of Western Europe
could be a part of than to simply take the Ruhr and its tremendous resources away from
Germany without giving them anything in return. Further, it believed that an international
regime that would include both German and wider Western European resources would
assuage the security concerns of Germany’s neighbors, prevent Germany from becoming
extraordinarily nationalist or Eastern-leaning, and help foster the integration of Western
Europe, something which had become very important to the Truman administration.225 It
would accomplish these things by making the German people feel as though their nation
was truly part of the Western community of nations, and not as though they were to be
the perpetually trod-upon losers of World War II.
While Douglas believed at the time that his remarks at the London Conference
“might be too ambitious and might look too far into the future,”226 what he said actually
ended up having a tremendous impact on the future of Europe. Shortly after the
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conclusion of the London Conference, the chief of the French Foreign Ministry’s
European desk wrote a background paper that acknowledged the wisdom of Douglas’
comments. In it, the Frenchman criticized the French government for not seriously taking
up the suggestion made by the United States that more than just the Ruhr should be
placed under some type of international control and asserted that the other industrial
regions of Western Europe should indeed be included as well. The author went on to
insist that Germany was integral to the unification of Western Europe. Without it,
European integration was nothing more than a “myth.”227 Douglas’ comments and this
background paper seem to have had, in turn, an impact on Jean Monnet, as, in 1950, the
Schuman Plan – which was remarkably similar to what Douglas had suggested and the
French background paper had echoed – was announced. It appears, then, that a
connection can be drawn between Truman administration policy and the Schuman
Declaration via the 1948 London Conference. While the impetus to create a supranational
authority for the coal and steel resources of France, West Germany, and other countries in
Western Europe came from Europe – as Truman believed it must – the idea behind it
was, in fact, originally American.228 To be sure, it can never be known with absolute
certainty whether Monnet would have come up with such an idea in the absence of
American influence. However, it can be said that, as it happened, his idea to take the
“functional approach” to European unity229 likely stemmed at least to some degree from
the comments that Douglas made in London in 1948, as these comments provided
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concrete ideas for Monnet to work with as he pondered the value of Western European
integration for France. American encouragement of the integration of Western Europe
through the Marshall Plan and the Truman administration’s recognition that the industrial
resources of the Ruhr, Saar, and other parts of Western Europe would be needed for the
revitalization of the entire Continent lead very naturally to the ideas at the heart of the
Schuman Declaration.
American involvement, therefore, seems to have played a critical role in shaping
the Schuman Plan. Not only did Truman work to foster European integration through the
Marshall Plan and its Organization for European Economic Cooperation, but the wariness
that he had about alienating Germany by stripping it of its ability to control the Ruhr also
led to his administration’s urging of the French to pursue a wider coal and steel pool of
some sort. His actions make it clear that he understood the importance of German
industry to postwar Western Europe, meaning that he simultaneously wanted to allow the
rest of that part of the Continent to have access to German resources while not losing
West Germany to the Soviets. France, which held a critical role in this entire effort,
seems to have been heavily influenced by the Truman administration’s ideas, as
Monnet’s plan for the pooling of all of Western Europe’s coal and steel resources closely
paralleled the suggestions that Douglas made at the 1948 London Conference. French
acquiescence to German reconstruction was also realized partially through the
tremendous amount of aid that the Marshall Plan had been able to contribute to the
Monnet Plan. The critical role of World War II, which vaulted the United States to its
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position of preeminence and gave it its extraordinary ability to exercise influence over
German and French postwar policies, can therefore again be seen remarkably clearly in
the story of European integration.
France, however, required more than Marshall Plan aid and the
internationalization of the Ruhr in order to feel sufficiently comfortable with the total
reindustrialization of Germany. Even though the internationalization of the Ruhr allowed
France to exercise some control over the distribution of its vast resources and helped
assuage French security concerns,230 it was still not enough to fully convince the French
that the reconstruction of Germany would not place them in danger. The French were, in
fact, so concerned about the danger posed by Germany in the immediate postwar period
that they concluded a mutual defense treaty with the United Kingdom that was
specifically aimed at Germany231 and wanted to see Germany remain occupied by the
Allies indefinitely.232 By 1949, though, Secretary of State Dean Acheson saw the
“diminution of direct allied control over Germany and the progressive reduction of
occupation troops” as “inevitable.” He and his Executive Committee on Foreign
Economic Policy had asserted five years before, after all, that, “An indefinitely continued
coercion of more than sixty million technically advanced people…would at best be an
expensive undertaking and would afford the world little sense of real security.”233 On the
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other hand, he recognized that without some sort of security pact between the United
States and the French, it was doubtful that they would ever accept such a minimallysupervised Germany,234 let alone a completely reindustrialized one that might be capable
of rearming itself as it had done in the interwar period. David Bruce, the U.S.
Ambassador to France, shared these sentiments, stating in October 1949,
All of the nations that were defeated by Germany in the last war, and in previous
wars, are conscious of her latent power and are haunted by the fear that a
reconstructed Germany will choose Russia rather than the West in the event of
another war. This underlying reality cannot be disregarded or expected to
disappear overnight. It must be accepted as a basic factor and compensated for as
such. That is why the [State] Department’s telegram appears to be unrealistic in
urging that France alone can take the lead in bringing about the reintegration of
Germany into Western Europe. France, and indeed no continental power, can take
that lead without assurances of the full backing of the US…accompanied by
precise and binding security commitments looking far into the future.235
The 1949 North Atlantic Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) that it created provided the answer to this problem of French insecurity vis-à-vis
a reconstructed Germany. France greatly feared being left alone on the Continent with
Germany, and the Truman administration believed that NATO was the way in which it
could prove to the French that they were not going to be abandoned by the United States,
even after it eventually stopped occupying West Germany.236 In addition to its obvious
purpose of securing an American commitment to defend the Continent in the event of a
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Soviet attack, then, NATO was created in part in order to provide security for France and
the other NATO member states against renewed German aggression, thereby paving the
way for West Germany to be fully reindustrialized and integrated into the Western
European community.237 The French, for their part, recognized that one of the major
purposes of NATO was to assuage their fears of a revitalized Germany. Indeed, by the
time the North Atlantic Treaty was ratified by the French Assembly in July 1949, many
French politicians recognized that a unified Europe would have to include Germany, and
that it simply could not function successfully as an economic unit without it. NATO
made it possible for them to embrace this reality, as it guaranteed that the United States
would come to their rescue if the Germans ever decided to initiate a conflict with them
again.238
The United States, therefore, clearly provided the security environment which
made the creation of the ECSC a possibility. While Rosato is right in stating that the
American security guarantee was not the motivation behind the Europeans’ desire to
pursue European integration,239 it certainly did a great deal to alleviate French security
concerns about a reindustrialized Germany, even one that was no longer occupied by the
Allies. Without the inclusion of a fully reindustrialized Germany that was capable of
contributing its tremendous economic potential to the coal and steel pool that the
Schuman Plan envisioned, the ECSC likely would not have become a reality. The United
States – and, to be more specific, the Truman administration – made the creation of the
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European Coal and Steel Community possible by providing the security umbrella which
made the French comfortable with the industrial situation in Germany that was necessary
for proposing and, ultimately, implementing it.240 Completely discounting the “U.S.
pacifier” argument, as Rosato has done,241 is incorrect as a result. Rather than looking at
the guaranteed American military assistance that NATO provided as the reason why the
French and the West Germans sought to pursue the unification of the Continent, one
ought to recognize that it was this American security guarantee that made it possible for
them to do so. In a word, it facilitated rather than motivated the implementation of the
Schuman Plan.
The United States’ policy of actively encouraging the creation of an integrated
Europe did not change when Dwight Eisenhower became president in January 1953. As
was the case with Truman, much of Eisenhower’s motivation for supporting the
Europeans’ drive toward unification stemmed from the Cold War conflict between the
United States and the Soviet Union. As excessive German nationalism was still an issue
when he took office,242 the Eisenhower administration was concerned about this
nationalism getting out of control. In the words of U.S. High Commissioner for Germany
Walter Donnelly,
Unless Ger[man] dynamism is able to express itself constructively by
participation in close European cooperation and in achieving an important place
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in world affairs, the more constructive pro-European German leaders will be
discredited, and more extreme men will take their places.243
The greatest danger that came along with German nationalism was the possibility that
German nationalists might seek to exploit East-West tensions and pursue the
reunification of their country in a manner that could lead to an Eastern-oriented Germany.
This was a disaster scenario for the Eisenhower administration, which knew like its
predecessor that the industrial resources of West Germany were critical to Western
European reconstruction and feared further that adding such resources to the Soviet side
could upset the balance of the postwar bipolar world order in their favor.244 Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles believed that if nationalism was allowed to take over in West
Germany, the desire to reunify with the eastern half of the country would
become so strong in Germany as to give rise to [the] temptation to discard the
associations with the West in an effort to advance reunification on terms which
would at best result in a neutral Germany and at worst result in an Easternoriented Germany.245
If this were to happen, the administration feared that nationalist movements in other
Western European states might subsequently be kindled,246 causing the entire effort to
integrate Western Europe to be put at significant risk. Eisenhower, therefore, believed
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that tying West Germany irrevocably into Western Europe was the only way to prevent
these things from happening, meaning that the successful establishment of the ECSC was
critical.
Eisenhower also believed that the United States stood to benefit substantially
from the integration of Western Europe. He envisioned a united Europe becoming the
world’s “third great power bloc,” a development which he thought would be able to
“solve the peace in the world.”247 Specifically, he held that “a united Europe consisting of
250 million-odd people, of whom at least 23 million were skilled workers, would create
an industrial complex comparable to the United States,” and that “such a ‘third force’
working with the rest of the free world would change the whole complexion of present
circumstances and insure peace.”248 Like many in Europe,249 then, Eisenhower thought
that an integrated Continent would be able to present itself as something of a third
superpower, able to place its weight on the scales and tip them in favor of peace. The
assumption among Americans was and had been for many years, of course, that the side
that most favored peace was the United States, and that Western Europe would naturally
gravitate toward it instead of toward the Soviet Union.250
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While this would certainly be beneficial to the Europeans as they sought to
prevent Soviet aggression against them, it would also assist the Americans by taking
some of the pressure of defending Western Europe off their shoulders. Eisenhower
recognized that the creation of a “third force” in Europe would allow the United States to
“sit back and relax somewhat,”251 as it would make the Western Europeans capable of
taking more responsibility for their own defense.252 Further, Eisenhower believed that a
unified and prosperous Western Europe would be capable of attracting all of the Soviet
Union’s Eastern European satellite states to it. This would cause the Soviet sphere of
influence to contract dramatically, allowing the West to gain a considerable power
advantage and making the threat to peace “disappear.”253 Such developments would be of
great benefit to the U.S., as Eisenhower was concerned about the large amount of money
that the U.S. was spending each year to keep troops stationed in Europe254 and hoped that
the American military could eventually permanently return to North America.255 The
successful establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community and the subsequent
strengthening of Western Europe were, therefore, high priorities for the Eisenhower
administration, as they represented the first steps toward the accomplishment of this goal.

251

Editorial Note, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Vol. IV, 348.

252

Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 147.

253

Editorial Note, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Vol. IV, 348.

254

“Minutes of the 212th Meeting of the Council of the OEEC,” Foreign Relations of the United States,
1952-1954, Vol. VI, 304.
255

Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 148.

81

Like Truman, Eisenhower also realized that the impetus for European integration
had to come from the Europeans themselves. It simply could not be forced upon them. He
nevertheless thought that the United States had a significant role to play in assisting their
efforts. In his first State of the Union address, delivered on February 3, 1953, he stated,
The needed unity of Western Europe manifestly cannot be manufactured from
without; it can only be created from within. But it is right and necessary that we
encourage Europe’s leaders by informing them of the high value we place upon
the earnestness of their efforts toward this goal. Real progress will be conclusive
evidence to the American people that our material sacrifices in the cause of
collective security are matched by essential political, economic, and military
accomplishments in Western Europe.256
Eisenhower was not alone in his belief that American assistance to the Continent was
essential. Monnet, for his part, also recognized how important it was to the establishment
of the fledgling European Coal and Steel Community that American support for it
continued beyond the end of the Truman administration. Indeed, he believed that
American support would be critical if the ECSC were to become a successful initial
manifestation of integration on the Continent.257 Adenauer echoed these sentiments,
stating that as the Truman administration vacated the White House,
The decisive question for us was whether the Eisenhower administration would
continue the European policy of the Democratic Party and President Truman. All
were agreed in Europe that without the support of the United States the decline of
Europe would be irreversible.
He was relieved, therefore, when, in 1953, “the American interest in the integration of
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Europe …was expressed even more strongly than in the second half of 1952.”258 Policy
elites on both sides of the Atlantic, then, clearly viewed American support for the
Europeans’ drive toward integration as essential to its ultimate success.
The first manifestation of this support came very early in the operation of the
ECSC. On February 18, 1953, just eight days after the common market for coal opened,
Eisenhower appointed David Bruce to be the U.S. Representative to the Coal and Steel
Community at Luxembourg, giving him the rank of ambassador. The State Department
explained,
By broadening his assignment in this way we will derive the maximum
psychological impact in Europe from this important new step….In addition, the
designation of Mr. Bruce to the CSC would be looked upon by Mr. Monnet and
his associates as perhaps the clearest indication we could give of our close support
for and belief in their experiment in six-country unification.259
By appointing a U.S. ambassador to the ECSC so early in its operation, the Eisenhower
administration publicly demonstrated its interest and faith in what was being
accomplished in Western Europe. Monnet recognized the gravity of this development,
asserting that the dispatch of an official American representative to the ECSC established
the community’s sovereignty and its place as a recognized entity under international
law.260 Giving Bruce the rank of ambassador put the United States’ relationship with the
ECSC on par with its relationships with other states, after all. Gaining an established
diplomatic connection to the most powerful Western country in the world also likely
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cemented the legitimacy of the ECSC in the minds of potential member states and trading
partners, increasing the probability that it would be able to survive the first few months
and years of its operation and become successfully established within Western Europe.
In addition to international recognition, the fledgling ECSC needed the proper
funding in order to be set up successfully. Despite the fact that it had inherited a lessthan-ideal fiscal situation from the Truman administration,261 a June 1953 visit from
Monnet – a close personal friend of Dulles262 – convinced the Eisenhower administration
that the timing was right for the United States to step in and provide this funding.263 As a
result, on June 15, Eisenhower sent a letter to Senator Alexander Wiley, chairman of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and Representative Robert B. Chiperfield,
chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, which strongly encouraged them
to support the extension of an American loan to the ECSC.264 These letters were wellreceived by both Wiley and Chiperfield,265 but no action was immediately taken to make
the loan a reality. Eisenhower refused to let the idea die, though, and, as 1953 came to a
close, he released a statement stating that he
was encouraged that the Coal and Steel Community is now in effective operation,
and reaffirm[ed] his hope that ways might be found to enable the United States to
assist, on a loan basis, in modernizing and developing…this Community.266
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As expected, the ECSC’s High Authority – the executive branch of the ECSC,
headed by Monnet himself – responded favorably to Eisenhower’s suggestions. It drafted
a resolution for the Common Assembly of the ECSC which stated that the assembly
welcomed “warmly the declaration of the President of the United States” that the
unification of Europe is a “necessity for the peace and prosperity of Europeans and of the
world.” In addition, the Common Assembly approved the idea of establishing a
partnership between the United States and the ECSC on the basis of cooperation instead
of on the basis of aid.267 The Europeans recognized that, since the Eisenhower
administration was proposing a loan instead of a grant to the ECSC, the United States
trusted them and had faith in their ability to create a successful, united European
community that would be capable of administering itself properly and paying back loans
in a timely manner. Monnet also worried that an indefinite donor and receiver
relationship between the U.S. and the ECSC would eventually harm the vital connection
that existed between the two entities.268 He and the Common Assembly desired to get
away from this model, which had formed the basis of the Marshall Plan,269 and pursue a
place of greater equality within the international community.
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While Monnet pressured the Eisenhower administration to make the ECSC loan at
least $400 million in order to ensure that it would properly “capture European
imagination,”270 Harold Stassen, the American Director of the Foreign Operations
Administration, believed that such a loan would be excessive. Instead, he suggested that
the U.S. provide a $100 million loan to the ECSC to be used
for the improvement of coal mines, power plants and coke plants, all of which
will strengthen the base of the Western European economy, improve its capability
to finance its own defense, and…encourage the essential move toward European
integration, which is highly desirable as a part of…basic policy.271
While Monnet initially balked at this figure,272 he eventually accepted it after a meeting
with Dulles in March 1954.273 The next month, the Eisenhower administration and the
High Authority of the ECSC agreed to the terms of a $100 million loan with an interest
rate of 3.7 percent.274 To Monnet, this loan was critical. He believed that, at the time that
the loan was conferred upon the ECSC, no state could have obtained such favorable
terms from the United States government, and that this gesture from the Eisenhower
administration firmly established the ECSC’s credit worldwide. As a result, despite only
being in its first year of full operation, the ECSC could “already think of borrowing on
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the private capital market.”275 The American loan to the ECSC, while not as large as
Monnet and others would have liked, nevertheless gave the ECSC the funds it desired
while opening the door to immediate borrowing from other sources. In its earliest days,
the United States clearly helped the ECSC get off on the right foot and establish itself
within Western Europe and the wider international community when it might not have
otherwise been able to do so.
In early 1955, however, Joseph Dodge, chairman of the Council on Foreign
Economic Policy, sent a memorandum to the State Department that accused the ECSC of
allowing “cartel developments” within its member states and raised the question of
whether, as a result, “U.S. policy concerning the Community should be subject to further
consideration.” In response to these concerns, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic
Affairs Samuel Waugh conceded that “it is apparent that various restrictive arrangements,
including the steel export cartel, exist among the industries of the CSC,” but nevertheless
recommended “that the United States should continue its strong support for the High
Authority and the Community especially in view of the far-reaching significance of the
CSC as a major step toward European unity.” He went on to state further
that the facts currently available to the Department concerning the points raised
by Mr. Dodge…do not warrant a reconsideration at this time of U.S. policy
towards the Coal and Steel Community.276

275

ibid.

276

“Memorandum from Assistant Secretary Waugh to Under Secretary Hoover,” Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1955-1957, Vol. IV, 261.

87

One month later, Dulles himself addressed Dodge’s concerns. He, like Waugh,
agreed that restrictive practices detrimental to American industry were in place in the
ECSC. He was aware that the steel producers of the ECSC had indeed established a cartel
to fix minimum prices for the community’s exports and that it had also designated two or
three American scrap dealers as “exclusive agents for scrap purchases in the United
States.” While this naturally led the administration to question “the compatibility of the
exclusive scrap purchasing arrangement with CSC objectives of establishing and
maintaining competitive conditions in the Community,” Dulles believed that it was not
enough to warrant the termination of the Eisenhower administration’s emphatic support
for the ECSC, including the $100 million loan that had been agreed upon the year
before.277 Indeed, Dulles, who was willing to allow short-term European needs to take
priority over American interests while the ECSC worked to establish itself,278 assured
Dodge in his official response to the Council on Foreign Economic Policy that the
restrictive arrangements would not last forever and stressed that the United States needed
to continue looking at the bigger picture. He said,
Some steps have already been taken by the High Authority against restrictive
arrangements and we have been assured that further measures are now in
preparation. We consider that there are reasonably good prospects for further
progress by the Community in combating such arrangements. The developments
cited by Mr. Dodge should, moreover, be considered in the broad perspective of
the Community’s potential contribution to U.S. interests in Europe….The
European Coal and Steel Community represents a dramatic movement in the
direction of European unity, the promotion of which has been established by
Congress and the Executive Branch as a basic objective of U.S. policy….[T]he
Community serves as a rallying point for those upholding the idea of a united
277

“Report from the Department of State to the Council on Foreign Economic Policy,” Foreign Relations
of the United States, 1955-1957, Vol. IV, 266.
278

Gillingham, European Integration, 1950-2003: Superstate or New Market Economy?, 28.

88

Europe. United States support for the CSC is widely recognized as a symbol of
U.S. interest in encouraging progress towards this goal….The provisions of the
CSC Treaty directed against monopolies and restrictive business practices…are
completely unprecedented in Europe. While the Community’s progress in
combating restrictive practices has been slow, it has been substantially more
active in this sphere than most individual European governments or other
international bodies….Much remains to be done, however, and we should
continue to give all possible encouragement to these governments, as well as to
the High Authority, toward further development of programs for the elimination
of restrictive business practices.279
In conclusion, Dulles stated,
The facts currently available to the Department concerning reported cartel
developments in the CSC, in conjunction with the steps which the High Authority
has taken and is anticipating in implementing the anti-cartel provisions in the CSC
Treaty, do not warrant a reconsideration at this time of U.S. policy towards the
Coal and Steel Community.280
The Eisenhower administration essentially argued that the ECSC simply needed more
time, patience, and encouragement from the United States to implement the provisions of
the Treaty of Paris, which included anti-cartel and trade liberalization provisions. The
successful establishment of the ECSC was so important to the Eisenhower administration
that it was willing to tolerate short-term restrictive European practices that had a negative
impact on American economic interests in the hope that this would help integration
become permanently established on the Continent.281 It understood how difficult it was to
set up a new supranational community like the ECSC – particularly since it was also
attempting to implement policies that had never before been seen in Europe – and
decided as a result to give it essentially as much time as it needed. The integration of
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Western Europe was simply too important to be interrupted by the short-term interests of
U.S. industry. The Eisenhower administration also clearly recognized that, eventually, the
existence of the ECSC would likely prove to be very beneficial for U.S. economic
interests and that, in reality, it was doing a better job of combating restrictive practices
than many European governments. After some short-term pain, the administration
believed that American industry would experience long-term benefits. Monnet and the
High Authority just needed a bit of time to get their feet on the ground.
All told, then, Rosato’s claim that American encouragement was neither a
necessary nor sufficient condition for European integration to take place282 is clearly
misguided, as it is simply not supported by the historical record. If his notion that the
Western Europeans desired to integrate the Continent simply to balance the power of the
Soviet Union were correct, such a claim may be logical. The previous chapter
demonstrated that this was not the case, however. Rather than focusing on the power of
the Soviet Union and trying to unite the Continent to balance it, the French and the West
Germans were primarily interested in their own national interests, which included
postwar recovery, the alleviation of French security concerns with regard to West
Germany, and the renewal of West German sovereignty. Again, it was World War II and
its aftermath – not the Cold War – that caused the Europeans to desire integration. The
Americans, who had been put in a position of incredible power by the war, created the
environment within which the Europeans could pursue their goals. Indeed, the American
policy of ardently encouraging and supporting European unity in the postwar era, which
spanned both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, played a critical role in
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making it possible for the ECSC to succeed. While these administrations had different
roles to play, both of their contributions to the earliest years of European integration were
vital to the successful establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community.
The Truman administration had the tremendous responsibility of deciding with
the Allies how postwar Europe should be addressed. In their minds, it was critical that
the region immediately rebuild itself without falling into the sphere of influence of the
Soviet Union or starting yet another global conflagration. Tying West Germany and its
resources irrevocably to the West through Continental integration was seen as the key to
accomplishing these goals, and, despite its recognition that the impetus for European
integration had to come from the Continent itself, the administration did whatever it
could to ensure that the majority of French and West German politicians were supportive
of this idea. Not only did it use the Marshall Plan’s Organization for European Economic
Cooperation to lay the foundations for a unified Europe, but it also used Marshall Plan
aid to help convince the French to accept U.S. policy vis-à-vis West Germany. The
Truman administration also worked to prevent the French from becoming so focused on
retaining their access to German resources that they would alienate the West Germans
and cause their increasing nationalism to get out of control. The American suggestion that
the internationalization of the Ruhr be folded into a wider Western European coal and
steel pool – the basic idea behind the Schuman Plan – was the way in which this was
accomplished. Perhaps most critically, though, the Truman administration used NATO to
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create the type of security environment that would allow the French to embrace the
reindustrialization of West Germany as well as its inclusion in the Western European
community, even after the Allied occupation eventually ended.
Upon taking office, the Eisenhower administration decided to continue the
Truman administration’s policy of encouraging European integration, although perhaps
for slightly different reasons. It had, however, come to office after the European Coal and
Steel Community had already been agreed upon. This gave it the opportunity to ensure
that the still-embryonic ECSC would be successfully established. From international
legal recognition through the dispatch of an American ambassador to the establishment of
the ECSC’s credit through the granting of a substantial loan to allowing American
economic interests to temporarily be placed on the back burner while the Europeans
worked to properly establish their new community, the actions that were taken by the
Eisenhower administration were critical. Without the actions of these two
administrations, it seems likely that the unification of the Continent never would have
occurred and, even if it had, it would not have experienced the success that it did. Indeed,
even Monnet and Adenauer recognized the incredible importance of American support
and encouragement for what they were trying to accomplish, and were anxious to see
these things continue to come from the White House when the Eisenhower administration
took office in 1953. As the most powerful state in the world with a great deal of influence
over the affairs of France and West Germany, the United States played a crucial role in
the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in a manner that no other
country could have.
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Four
Conclusion
The preceding pages have, through an examination of the historical record, made
it plain that France and West Germany were driven to pursue the creation of the
European Coal and Steel Community for state-centric reasons that came about largely as
a result of their relationships with one another within the postwar context. World War II
is, again, critical to gaining an accurate understanding of the genesis of European
integration. Additionally, it should be apparent that the United States did indeed play a
decisive role in not only the creation of the ECSC, but also its successful establishment in
the 1950s. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations saw the unification of Western
Europe as a critical foreign policy goal, and they can both be pointed to as effective
facilitators of the Europeans’ desire to pursue the integration of the Continent. The
creation of a counterfactual may be a useful way to explore these points further and
demonstrate quite clearly that both Rosato’s balance-of-power argument283 and his claim
that American involvement in early European integrationist efforts was neither sufficient
nor necessary for Continental unification to take place284 are indeed incorrect. This will
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be accomplished, of course, by constructing an alternate world in which Rosato’s claims
are correct, and will allow the reader to clearly understand what one would and would not
expect to find in the historical record of such a world.
The motives that drove France and West Germany to pursue the unification of the
Continent through the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community will be
addressed first. If Rosato’s argument were correct, and the Europeans sought to integrate
solely in order to balance the tremendous power of the Soviet Union, this would be
reflected in a number of differences in the historical record. First, one would see a clear
indication that the Soviet Union was seen in postwar France as a much bigger threat than
Germany, despite the fact that Germany had invaded France twice in the last half century
and the Soviet Union had not. This would have manifest itself partially through a French
decision to eschew the creation of new treaties like the Treaty of Dunkirk that explicitly
named Germany as a security threat and would require, of course, that the recent history
of terrible warfare that France had experienced with Germany be eclipsed in the minds of
the French essentially immediately after the end of World War II by the prospect of going
to war with the USSR.
The replacement of Germany by the Soviet Union as France’s greatest security
threat would have brought along with it a number of practical implications as well,
including a substantially weakened desire in France to see Germany held down. Indeed, if
the Soviet Union was France’s focus in the postwar period, then the French would have
embraced not only the end of the Allied Occupation regime, but also, and just as
importantly, the complete reindustrialization and rearmament of West Germany. These

94

things would, in fact, likely have been a priority for France. In addition, if the French
were simply trying to balance the power of the Soviet Union and were less interested in
the reconstruction of their own country, then unfettered French access to the industrial
resources of the Ruhr and the Saar would not have been one of France’s highest
priorities. Instead, the French would have wanted to see German industrial production
expand, even at the expense of French access to these resources, as this would have
transformed West Germany into a much more powerful and useful ally against the
Soviets that stood geographically between France and the USSR. The French desires to
internationalize the Ruhr and maintain control over the Saar through a customs union and
the admittance of the Saar as an independent member of the Council of Europe would not
have had much salience in such a situation, and the French would not have pushed hard
for them and allowed them to become the sources of tension with and nationalism in
West Germany that they ended up being.
The timeline of European integration also would have been drastically altered if
the French had been principally concerned with balancing the Soviet Union. If the USSR
was France’s principle security threat and it was more interested in being allied to a
strong West Germany that could help it balance the USSR than in seeing its long-time
nemesis held down in the wake of the most destructive war in world history, then the
French would have pursued the integration of Western Europe earlier than 1950, when
the Schuman Declaration was made. This is because the security guarantee against
Germany that was given to France by the United States through the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization would not have been necessary, meaning France would not have had any
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reason to wait until after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty to propose the creation
of the ECSC. Instead, France would have proposed the integration of the Continent at the
first sign of trouble for Western Europe from the USSR – presumably the 1948 Berlin
Blockade – as the threat posed by the USSR would have had to have been solidified in
the minds of the French long before the outbreak of the Korean War, which occurred
after the Schuman Declaration.
Additionally, France would have proposed a much different-looking form of
European integration if the Soviet Union was the target of such action. While it would,
perhaps, still have made sense to build up Western Europe’s war making ability via the
integration and strengthening of France and West Germany’s coal and steel industries, it
would have been a priority for France to create an integrated military command for the
Western European nations that were integrating. This is because, as Rosato points out,
when a group of minor powers is attempting to balance a great power, they will create an
integrated military establishment and central authority,285 as this is the most efficient and
effective way to balance the threat that is posed by such a power. As a result, France
would have proposed this form of integration either at the same time that it was
proposing the ECSC or, more likely, in place of the ECSC, as this would have allowed
Western Europe to have its best shot at balancing Soviet power.
Things also would have been much different in West Germany if the French and
the Germans had been pursuing Western European integration purely to balance the
Soviet Union. First of all, any vestiges of conflict between France and West Germany
would have been effectively put on the back burner as they paled in comparison to the
285

ibid., 51.

96

perceived Soviet threat. As stated above, France would have, instead, been concerned
primarily with seeing to it that West Germany became a powerful ally against the
Soviets, meaning Germany would not have had to deal with the Allied Occupation
regime in the manner in which it did. This, in turn, would have led to a decreased desire
by the West German government to secure independence and the restoration of German
sovereignty in the wake of the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany, meaning West
German accession to the Council of Europe would not have held the significance that it
did. Indeed, France may have been able to convince the United States and United
Kingdom to end the occupation not too long after the war, as it no longer feared German
aggression above all else and would have prioritized the creation of a strong West
Germany that stood between it and the Soviets. West German sovereignty would have
subsequently been restored and the West German government would not have seen the
restoration of the equality of their country as their overriding goal. If this would not have
been possible, however, the West Germans nevertheless would have viewed balancing
the Soviet Union as a more important goal than the restoration of German sovereignty
and the end of the occupation, meaning the presence of British and American troops
would have been welcomed, not loathed, as these troops would have been on hand – and
would have dragged these two states into war on the side of West Germany – in the event
of a Soviet invasion. In addition, since France would have feared Soviet aggression
instead of German aggression, the West Germans would not have had to worry about
assuaging French security concerns as part of their attempt to regain their sovereignty. In
fact, this would have been a non-issue, as the French would have been far more worried
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about the Soviets than they were about the Germans, who they would have viewed as
their partners in defending Western Europe from the Communists rather than their
historical enemies who could rise up against them again at a moment’s notice.
On the American side of the story, if the efforts of the United States to encourage
and support European integration were unnecessary and the Europeans would have
pursued Continental integration in order to balance the threat posed by the Soviet Union
regardless of what the Americans were doing, the historical record would, again, reflect
these differences. For one thing, while the United States likely would have nevertheless
viewed the encouragement of the integration of Western Europe as a foreign policy
priority, the concrete ideas about how this should be executed that it shared with France
would not have had the impact that they did. As stated above, it seems logical that France
may have proposed something similar to the ECSC in an effort to balance the USSR, but
it is more likely that it would have proposed an integrated military structure for Western
Europe. If the United States’ efforts were insignificant, therefore, the French would have
followed a different course of action from the one that had been suggested to them by the
United States at the 1948 London Conference on Germany. The U.S. would not have had
to make these suggestions in the first place, though, as the internationalization of the
Ruhr at West Germany’s expense would not have been a high priority for France and the
Americans would not have been worried about the alienation of the Germans.
This alternate course would also include, as indicated above, the announcement of
the Schuman Plan before the creation of NATO, as the security guarantee provided by
American forces against the Germans would have been unnecessary and irrelevant if the
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French saw the USSR as their primary security threat. The Truman administration would
not have viewed Marshall Plan aid as a way of purchasing French assent to German
reconstruction, either, as France would have embraced this reconstruction
wholeheartedly, as made plain above. Additionally, the European leaders who were
primarily responsible for the creation of an integrated Europe would not have made it
clear through their words and their deeds that the U.S. had an integral role to play in the
successful establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community. Monnet, for his
part, would not have approached the Eisenhower administration for a loan in the manner
that he did, and he would not have pointed to the United States as the nation that
established the ECSC’s credit worldwide and gave it its tremendously important ability to
borrow from private lenders through the conferral of this loan. Monnet also would not
have stated that the United States’ decision to dispatch an ambassador to the ECSC was
what gave the community its legal standing in the international system, and neither he nor
Adenauer would have explicitly said that American support for and encouragement of
European integration were essential.
Finally, if the Europeans had been solely motivated by a desire to balance the
Soviet Union, then the European Union surely would have become obsolete the moment
the USSR collapsed and no longer posed any sort of threat to the Continent. If the states
involved in the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community and the subsequent,
more complicated iterations of Continental integration that followed were simply trying
to balance the power of the Soviet Union, after all, then European integration would have
completely lost its purpose as soon as the Soviet Union ceased to exist, meaning Rosato’s
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notions regarding the inevitable “fraying” of the European Union286 would be correct.
One must keep in mind, however, that the historical record indicates very clearly that the
Europeans were not simply attempting to balance the power of the Soviet Union as they
unified the Continent. It also makes it plain that the efforts of the United States to
facilitate the Western Europeans’ pursuit of integration were critical, and that European
integration likely would not have happened apart from them. Indeed, the entirety of the
foregoing counterfactual is, quite obviously, not historically accurate in the least,
meaning Rosato’s claims cannot be accurate either, as, if they were, the counterfactual
presented above would not be a counterfactual at all. Instead, it would simply be a
description of the historical record.
What the historical record does show very clearly, however, is that, far from being
an effort to balance the Soviet Union, the creation of the European Coal and Steel
Community was an attempt by France and West Germany to pursue separate sets of statecentric goals that each country’s government believed would be beneficial for its
respective state. In France, these goals stemmed primarily from two sources: France’s
need to maintain access to German natural resources in order to keep its Plan de
Modernisation et Ré-équipment operating smoothly, and its fear of future German
aggression in light of its experiences since 1870. Monnet believed that the creation of the
European Coal and Steel Community would be the most effective way to maintain
French access to important West German natural resources while allowing the French to
keep a close eye on the Germans and ensure that they were not using their coal and steel
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industries to rearm themselves as they had done in the interwar period. In essence, France
wanted to regain its strength while Germany was held down, and this was the underlying
factor that ultimately drove the actions of the French.
The West Germans, on the other hand, were focused on the restoration of their
sovereignty, independence, and equality within the international community after the
unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany. Adenauer believed that joining the Council of
Europe would be an effective first step on the road toward this goal, but the status of the
Saar had to be satisfactorily worked out before this could happen. West Germany’s
accession to the ECSC was able to solve this problem while simultaneously helping to
assuage French security concerns and stem the tide of growing German nationalism.
Rather than being “obsessed” with the power of the Soviet Union, as Rosato claims,287
Adenauer, along with Monnet, Schuman, and the other pioneers of European integration,
was focused on the national goals that could be accomplished through the creation of the
European Coal and Steel Community. The beginning of the Cold War and a desire to
balance the power of the Soviet Union simply did not cause the Western Europeans to
pursue the integration of the Continent in the years following World War II, as it was the
conditions that existed following this war that actually led to the integration of Europe.
The historical record also clearly demonstrates that the United States played an
invaluable role in the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community. In addition to
laying the foundation for European integration through the creation of the Organization
for European Economic Cooperation, the Americans provided the French Foreign
Ministry with the concepts that ended up defining the Schuman Plan and the ECSC.
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Further, it is clear that the French were very worried about the possibility of future
German aggression in the years after World War II, meaning they would not be able to
embrace the creation of a fully reindustrialized West Germany that was no longer
occupied by the Allied powers without being able to count on the United States for
assistance if the Germans should attempt to initiate a conflict with them again. Robust
German coal and steel industries were necessary for the successful implementation of the
Schuman Plan, however, meaning the fact that the Truman administration was willing to
entangle itself in Continental security via the creation of NATO was a critical facilitating
factor for the ECSC. While Rosato is correct in stating that the security guarantee against
future German aggression that the Americans gave the French through the creation of
NATO did not motivate European integration,288 it was integral in paving the way for the
French to propose the unification of the Continent. Without American encouragement of
and support for European integration in the postwar world, then, the unification of
Western Europe probably never would have happened. Finally, the actions of the
Eisenhower administration, including the dispatch of an American ambassador to the
ECSC, the conferral of a sizeable loan to the ECSC, and the placement of short-term
European interests over the interests of the United States, played an essential part in
seeing to it that the European Coal and Steel Community was able to successfully
establish itself and become a permanent part of the European landscape.
In sum, since the historical record does not support Rosato’s arguments regarding
either the origins of the European Coal and Steel Community or the role played by the
United States in the creation of that community, it follows logically that it also does not
288
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support his predictions regarding the future of Europe. Indeed, contrary to what Rosato
believes, the end of the Soviet Union has not created a situation in which the Europeans
“have no compelling reason to preserve their economic community.”289 Instead, since the
existence of the USSR was clearly not the driving factor in the Europeans’ decision to
pursue integration, the current nonexistence of the USSR ought to have little effect on
whether the European Union is sustained, deepened, or allowed to fall by the wayside.
Since France and West Germany were seeking to achieve largely state-centric goals
through the creation of the ECSC, it should not be assumed that, if these or other states
decide to take actions that they perceive to be in their best interests but not necessarily in
the best interest of the EU has a whole, they are doing so simply because the Soviet threat
is gone and they feel no need to sustain the European Union.290
Rather, such behavior ought to be viewed as nothing more than a continuation of
the state-centric, national interests-driven mindsets that were held by France and West
Germany when they set up the ECSC. If EU member states’ malfeasance is seen in this
light, it becomes clear that the future of the European Union will be decided by whether
or not the various members of the EU believe that continued participation in the EU will
allow them to achieve their respective states’ current goals. These states’ relationships
with one another are also likely to continue to play an important part in determining the
future of European unification, as the relationship between France and West Germany in
the postwar world had a substantial impact on those states’ desires to pursue the
integration of the Continent in the first place. A remarkable degree of continuity can,
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therefore, be readily identified between the earliest years of Continental integration and
the current situation in Europe, with states seeking their own national interest and the
relationship between France and Germany – the most critical states in Western Europe
both then and now – taking center stage.
Such ideas find support even among other realists, with Stanley Hoffmann serving
as an example. In his seminal article on Western European integration, “Obstinate or
Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe,” he puts forth
the ideas that, in the postwar era, “Germany accepted dependence on the U.S. not merely
as a comfort, but as a necessity as vital as breathing,” and that the “recovery of equality
was…[a] vital goal [for the Germans].”291 Further, Hoffmann contends that the French
still deeply feared Germany as the drive toward integration got started,292 and that the
earliest forms of Continental integration worked because each state wanted to maximize
its wealth.293 While he may put too much emphasis on the Soviet threat as a motivation
for West Germany to pursue integration, Hoffmann nonetheless recognizes the
importance of each state’s “different pulls and different pasts.” 294 Each state had its own
reasons for pursuing the integration of Western Europe, and each wanted to integrate with
the other member states of the ECSC on terms that it found to be pleasing and
appropriate295 and which would afford it the maximum benefit.

291

Stanley Hoffmann, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western
Europe,” Daedalus, Vol. 95, No. 3 (Summer 1966), 874-875.
292

ibid., 875.

293

ibid., 886.

294

ibid., 908.

104

Hoffmann also holds that, despite integration, the state remains the highest
possessor of power, and that the power of institutions such as those created in Europe is
“limited, conditional, dependent, and reversible.”296 Ultimately, the direction of an
integrated Europe is decided by the individual states involved in its creation.297
Therefore, it should not be assumed, as Rosato has done, that a lack of total political and
military integration on the Continent in the wake of the Cold War indicates that the
Europeans sought to integrate in order to counter the Soviet threat and that the removal of
this threat is the reason why these types of integration have not been forthcoming.298
Instead, in the words of Hoffmann,
the common organs set up by the national governments, when they try to act as a
European executive and parliament, they are both condemned to operate in the
fog maintained around them by the governments….Europe cannot be what some
of nations have been: a people that creates its state; nor can it be what some of the
oldest states are and many of the new ones aspire to be: a people created by the
state. It has to wait until the separate states decide that their peoples are close
enough to justify the setting up of a European state whose task will be the welding
of the many into one.299
Clearly, realists such as Hoffmann believe that the state has been and will continue to be
the most important actor in Europe despite the Continent’s integration. This is a trend that
has continued uninterrupted since the genesis of the ECSC. Both the respective
295
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motivations and perceptions of national interest that are held by each state matter a great
deal, and external factors such as the presence or absence of the Soviet Union do play a
determining role in whether deeper integration is embraced or eschewed.
While the European debt crisis has been a remarkably trying time for the
European Union and its member states, the drive toward further integration that it appears
to have sparked provides further support for the notion that the dissolution of the Soviet
Union has not determined the future course of European unification. This movement
toward further integration includes not only binding new rules on taxation and spending,
but also automatic penalties for states that overspend.300 In addition, European Union
finance ministers have agreed to give the EU the power to scrutinize the eurozone
members’ budgets before they have been approved by national parliaments, giving the
EU a chance to make recommendations about national tax and spending policies.301 A
€700 billion firewall has also recently been agreed upon, with €500 billion being set aside
for the new European Stability Mechanism and the rest coming from the existing
European Financial Stability Facility.302 Finally, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has
expressed a vision of a Europe that features a much more federal structure, with the EU’s
European Commission coming to function more like the Continent’s central
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government.303 These developments are clear evidence of a drive toward further
European integration, making it plain that the financial crisis has led to deeper integration
of the Continent rather than the undoing of the great strides that have been made since the
creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, as Rosato predicts. Again, rather
than the existence or non-existence of the Soviet Union, the critical determining factor for
the future of the European Union will be whether or not the individual member states of
the EU continue to believe that membership in this organization serves the national
interests of their respective states. If they continue to see EU membership as beneficial,
then the world will likely be given the opportunity to witness the strengthening of
Europe’s most important – and the world’s most advanced – regional institution, an
institution that grew directly out of the rubble of World War II. If, however, the
Europeans do decide at some point to put an end to their experiment in Continental
unification, it will be because the most important EU member states – including,
critically, modern-day France and Germany – see such a course of action as being in their
respective states’ best interests, and not because the Soviet Union has ceased to exist.
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